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CASENOTES
Probation Officer Interrogation of Probationers in Noncustodial Settings and the Pro-
bationer's Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Minnesota v. Murphyt The fifth
amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[n]o person ... shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ... ."2 This portion of the
fifth amendment, commonly referred to as the privilege against self-incrimination, pro-
tects individuals from having to answer incriminating questions in any civil or criminal
proceeding, and from the use of compelled testimony as evidence in a subsequent
criminal trial. 5 As a general rule, in order to come under the privilege's protection,
individuals must affirmatively claim the privilege by refusing to respond to questions on
the basis that the answers would tend to be incriminating. 4 Failure to claim the privilege
is excused, however, when a person is "compelled" to give incriminating testimony. 5
Individuals may object to subsequent use of their statements, and if the reviewing
court determines that the statements were compelled, they will be excluded from use in
evidence at criminal trial. 6 When confessions are obtained through police interrogations,
courts determine whether the statements should be admitted by applying either the
Miranda rule or the voluntariness standard. Under the Miranda rule, the state must
satisfy two conditions before it may use a statement obtained through interrogation in
its case in chief. First, the state must show that the suspect was advised of his rights prior
I 104 S. Ct. 1136 (1984).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3 The fifth amendment provides individuals with the right to refuse to answer incriminating
questions without sanction. See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973) (a witness protected
by the privilege against self-incrimination may refuse to answer incriminating questions unless he
is granted immunity from the use of his answers against him).
4 The privilege is not self-executing. In most contexts, an individual who desires fifth amend-
ment protection must assert it. See United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 (1943) (if a witness
"desires the protection of the privilege, he must claim it or he will not be considered to have been
'compelled' within the meaning of the Amendment"). For examples of how an individual can claim
the privilege see infra note 60. Once the privilege is asserted, an individual may not be compelled
to answer potentially incriminating questions. See Uniformed Sanitation Men v. Commissioner of
Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280, 284-85 (1968) (dismissal of government employees because they had
asserted the privilege and refused to testify violates fifth amendment). If, however, an individual
does not object, and instead makes damaging disclosures in response to questioning, the privilege
is forfeited and there is no later right to object to the use of the statements in a subsequent criminal
trial. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 370-71 (1951) (an individual who testifies before a
grand jury without claiming the privilege may not later object to the use of incriminating statements
against her).
5 Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 241 (1941) (a confession is deemed compelled when a
government official denies an individual the "free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer").
See, e.g., Uniformed Sanitation Men v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280, 284-85 (1968)
(statements resulting from proceeding which presented individuals with a choice between surren-
dering the privilege against self-incrimination or their jobs inadmissible in subsequent criminal
trials); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (statements resulting from questioning initiated
by law enforcement officers after a suspect has been taken into custody deemed compelled if the
suspect is not warned of his rights prior to questioning).
6 The fifth amendment, by its terms, excludes evidence obtained in violation of the privilege
against self-incrimination. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Exclusion of the confession means that the
individual's admissions cannot be used at trial as direct evidence to convict him of a crime.
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to any questioning by police officers.' Second, the state must show that the suspect
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived those rights.s Miranda, however, applies
only when a confession is obtained during a custodial interrogation of a suspect by law
enforcement officials.' In cases when a suspect is not questioned while in custody, courts
examine the admissibility of confessions through application of the due process volun-
tariness standard. 1 ° Under this standard, confessions may be admitted if after considering
the "totality of the circumstances," the court determines that the statements were made
voluntarily.' I
When the interrogation situation involves probation officers questioning probation-
ers, courts have been in conflict as to whether a probation officer is required to give
Miranda warnings before questioning the probationer. 12 Some courts have also raised
7
 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966). The suspect must be warned that he has the
right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed if he so
desires. Id.
8 Id. at 475-77, 479. See also Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469, 470 (1980) (per curiam) (reliance
upon a presumption that one given Miranda warnings understands the rights involved is inconsistent
with the burden placed by Miranda to show a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver). The
voluntariness of the waiver is determined by considering all surrounding circumstances. Miranda,
384 U.S. at 475-76.
See California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1123 (1983) (per curiam); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429
U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347-48 (1976).
' 6 The fourteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that no state shall ''deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . .." U.S. Comr. amend. XIV.
Due process requires fundamental fairness and justice in the use of evidence. Lisenba v. California,
314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941). According to the United States Supreme Court, "Mlle aim of the
requirement of clue process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent funda-
mental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true or false." Id. As an illustration of this
concept, the Court stated that "unfairness exists when a coerced confession is used as a means of
obtaining a verdict of guilt." Id. at 236-37.
" Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969). The due process "voluntariness" standard requires
an appellate court to independently examine the entire factual record of each case — the "totality
of the circumstances" — to determine how much pressure on the suspect is permissible. Id. A
confession is involuntary if the individual's will has been overborne by the conduct of the state's
law enforcement officials and the confession is not freely self-determined. Rogers v. Richmond,
365 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1961). For a discussion of the factors involved in assessing the voluntariness
of an individual's responses see infra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
12 Most courts have held that probation officers are required to give Miranda warnings if a
probationer is in custody at the time questioned. See, e.g., Marrs v. State, 53 Md. App. 230, 452
A.2d 992 (1982) (in-custody probationers must be warned of their rights prior to questioning
because probation officers are law enforcement officers within the meaning of Miranda, and pro-
bationers are under heavy psychological pressure to answer questions asked by probation officers).
See also United States v. Steele, 419 F. Supp. 1385, 1386-87 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (statements taken
without warnings from probationer who was being transported to jail by probation officer held to
be inadmissible); State v. Magby, 113 Ariz. 345, 349, 554 P.2d 1272, 1276 (1976) (statements taken
without Miranda warnings from probationers in jail by probation officers held to be inadmissible);
State v. Lekas, 201 Kan. 579, 582-84, 442 P.2d II, 15-16 (1968) (Miranda warnings must be given
when parole officers investigate the commission of a new crime by a parolee who is in custody).
Other courts have held that Miranda is totally inapplicable to the probationary relationship,
and thus, warnings were not required even when the probationer was in custody. See Nettles v.
State, 248 So. 2d 259, 260 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (probationers waive their right to warnings
from probation officers when they accept probation); Connell v. State, 131 Ga. App. 213, 214, 205
S.E.2d 513, 515 (1974) (probationer already advised of fifth amendment rights when taken into
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the issue of whether the probation officer's ability to recommend revocation of probation
amounts to a threat of legal sanction which makes the probationer's statements invol-
untary under the due process voluntariness standard,'"
In Minnesota v. Murphy," the Supreme Court resolved these issues. First, the Court
held that Miranda warnings are not required to be given by probation officers during
noncustodial meetings.'" Second, the Court ruled that statements made to a probation
officer were not involuntary under the due process standard because fear of probation
revocation for refusing to answer a probation officer's questions is not reasonable.' 6
The respondent in Minnesota v. Murphy, Marshall Murphy, was charged with criminal
sexual conduct in 1982. After pleading guilty to a reduced offense of false imprisonment,
he was placed on probation for three years.I 7 The terms of Murphy's probation directed
that he attend a treatment program for sexual offenders, report to his probation officer
"as directed," and be truthful with that officer "in all matters."' Furthermore, he was
informed that failure to comply with any of these conditions could result in his probation
being revoked."' Thereafter, Murphy began a series of regular monthly meetings with
his probation officer at her office, 2° and also participated in a treatment program at
Alpha House, a rehabilitation center for sexual offenders. 21
During a therapy session, Murphy admitted to an Alpha House counselor that he
had committed a rape and murder in 1974. 22 The counselor subsequently contacted
custody). See generally Note, State v. Magby: Application of the Miranda Doctrine to In-Custody Proba-
tioners, 7 Cm,. U.1,, REV. 103 (1977); Comment, Probation Officer Interrogation of an In-Custody
Probationer: An Analysis of the Applicability of the Miranda Doctrine and the Voluntariness Standard, 10
U.S.F.L. REV. 441 (1976).
' 5 See People v. Garcia, 240 Cal. App. 2d 9, 12-13, 49 Cal. Rptr. 146, 148 (1966) (absent
evidence that statements are obtained by threats, or promises or by any sort of pressure, proba-
tioners' statements to probation officer are voluntary); State v. Gallagher, 38 Ohio St. 2d 291, 297,
313 N.E.2d 396, 400 (1974), vacated, 425 U.S. 257 (1976), on remand, 46 Ohio St. 2d 225. 227-28,
348 N.E.2d 336, 337-38 (1976) (parolee's awareness that his parole officer has authority to rec-
ommend that be return to prison deters him from refusing to answer the parole officer's questions
and renders the parolee's statements involuntary).
'104 S. Ct. 1136 (1984).
'' Id. at 1144-46.
' 6 Id. at 1146-49.
0 Id, at 1140.
IN Id.
19 Id. Murphy knew his probation officer had the power CO recommend revocation. See infra
note 21.
2" Id. Murphy would call his probation officer each month to schedule an appointment. The
probation officer described the general interview format as follows: "We would discuss any changes
that had occurred in his . . . life situation since I had last met with him, [and] his progress [in a
treatment program] .... He discussed his employment quite often, many problems that arose with
that, or with personal relationships." Brief of Petitioner, Appendix C at 5-6, Minnesota v. Murphy,
104 S. Ct. 1136 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Pet. App. C].
2 ' 104 S. Ct. at 1140. In July, 1981, Murphy stopped participating in the treatment program.
Id. His probation officer wrote to Murphy and informed him that failure to contact her promptly
to set up a meeting would result in an immediate request for a warrant for his arrest. Id. Murphy
scheduled a meeting at which the officer agreed not to seek revocation of probation for his non-
participation in the treatment program. Id. Since Murphy was employed and doing well in other
areas, his probation officer did not require him to continue to attend the treatment program. Id.
22 Id. In 1974, Murphy was twice questioned by the Minneapolis Police concerning the rape
and murder of a teenage girl. No charges were then brought. Id.
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Murphy's probation officer." Although the officer wanted to inform the police, the
counselor's information could not be disclosed at that point because of applicable con-
fidentiality laws." The probation officer, however, wrote Murphy a letter requesting that
he arrange a meeting to discuss treatment for the rest of his time on probation."
Pursuant to that letter, Murphy contacted the probation officer and arranged to meet
with her."
At the outset of the meeting, the officer confronted Murphy with what she had
learned from the Alpha House counselor.2' Murphy became angry and stated that he
"felt like calling a lawyer."" The probation officer responded by indicating that Murphy
could not call from her office and would have to settle that problem later." She added
that her concern was to talk to him about the relationship between the rape-murder and
the incident that led to his conviction for false imprisonment."
Murphy responded by denying that he was guilty of the false imprisonment charge. 3 '
When the officer questioned Murphy about the rape-murder, Murphy eventually ad-
mitted that he had committed the crimes, but explained that further treatment was not
necessary because the rape-murder was caused by a drug habit that he had since broken,"
At the end of the conversation, the probation officer told Murphy for the first time that
she was obligated to report what she had learned to the police, and encouraged him to
turn himself in." Murphy then left the office. 34 After talking with an attorney, Murphy
23 id .
24 Id. at 1 140 n.l. Alpha House was covered by federal statutes which keep patient records in
federally assisted rehabilitation programs confidential. See 21 U.S.C. § 1175; 42 U.S.C. § 4582. The
Court noted that the counselor legitimately informed the probation officer of Murphy's admissions.
104 S. C,. at 1140 n.1. The Court assumed, however, that the counselor could not have provided
the information to the police nor could the probation officer have made the information available
for use in a criminal trial. Id. Thus, had Murphy's probation officer informed the police at that
point, the information could not have been used to convict Murphy. Id.
25 Id. at 1140. The probation officer knew that she would report any incriminating statements
which Murphy made at the meeting. Id. The Court, however, indicated that there was no evidence
that the sole purpose of the meeting was to obtain incriminating statements for the police. Id. at
1140 n.2. Moreover, the Court noted that it made no difference if a desire to obtain incriminating
statements was the probation officer's sole purpose in calling the meeting. Id.
2'i
	 at 1140.
27 Id .
28 Id. The Supreme Court accepted the trial court's conclusion that Murphy's statement did not
constitute an invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 1140 n.3. The trial court
found that Murphy had expressed the desire to speak with a lawyer solely in the context of a civil
suit for the breach of confidentiality. Id. Because the Minnesota Supreme Court did not reach this
issue, the Supreme Court did not question the trial court's factual finding. Id. The Supreme Court
did, however, note that Murphy had no federally protected right to have an attorney present at
the meeting because he was not in custody. Id. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded Murphy's
request for a lawyer was not sufficient to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination. Id.
29 Id. at 1140-41.
38 Id. at 1141.
51 Id.
32 Id. See also Pet. App. C, supra note 20, at 17-18.
83
 104 S. Ct. at 1141.
34 Id. The probation officer testified that her door was unlocked and that Murphy was physically
free to leave at any time without talking with her. Pet. App. C, supra note 20, at 17-18. Murphy
testified that he did not feel free to leave because that would have been a violation of his probation.
Id.
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told his probation officer that he had been advised not to turn himself in to the police. 35
The probation officer then procured issuance of a warrant for his arrest." Subsequently,
Murphy was arrested and indicted for first degree murder as a consequence of the
testimony given by his probation officer."
At trial, Murphy moved to suppress the statements he had made to his probation
officer on the grounds that they were obtained in violation of his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination and his fourteenth amendment right to due process."
After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion and held the statements admissible. 3°
After Murphy was convicted of first degree murder, he appealed directly to the Min-
nesota Supreme Court. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding the confession
inadmissible because the probation officer did not warn Murphy of his privilege against
self-incrimination."
After the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari,'" it reversed the
Minnesota Supreme Court and held that Murphy's constitutional rights were not violated
by the admission at trial of his confession to his probation officer, The Court noted
that there are only a few exceptions to the rule that individuals must affirmatively claim
the privilege. The Court added that such exceptions included situations where individ-
uals are interrogated while in custody and where individuals are threatened with pen-
alties for asserting the privilege:" Because it first determined that Murphy was not
placed in an inherently coercive setting akin to custodial interrogation:" the Court
35 104 S. Ct. at 1141.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. Because the trial court found the setting of the interview was not "custodial," it held that
Miranda was not applicable. Id. See supra note 9 and cases cited therein. Thus, the fact that no
Miranda warnings were given to Murphy did not require the exclusion of his statements. After
finding Miranda inapplicable, the trial court also Found that Murphy's statements were voluntary
under the due process voluntariness standard. 104 S. Ct. at 1141.
4° State v. Murphy, 324 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn. 1982). The court began by recognizing that,
as a general rule, individuals must assert their privilege against self-incrimination before they will
come under the fifth amendment's protection. Id. at 342-43. The court, however, added that
Murphy's failure to claim the privilege did not bar his later reliance on the privilege. Id. at 344.
The court explained that while Murphy was not in custody in the usual sense of being under arrest,
his probationary status and the nature of the meeting were sufficiently like custodial interrogation
that no affirmative claim of the privilege was required. Id. The court stated that Murphy's status
as a probationer was analogous to that of an individual being interrogated in police custody because
three factors restricted Murphy's freedom of action. The first factor was that Murphy was under
legal compulsion to attend meetings. The second factor was that he was under court order to
respond truthfully to the probation officer's questions. The final factor was that the probation
officer had substantial reason to believe that Murphy's answers were likely to be incriminating. Id.
According to the Minnesota Supreme Court, these three factors mandated that Murphy be warned
by the probation officer of his privilege against self-incrimination before questioning. Id. The court
concluded that Murphy's statements were barred "as a matter of due process" because Murphy's
probation officer failed to give warnings when she had already decided to report his answers to the
police. Id.
4 ' Minnesota v. Murphy, 459 U.S. 1145 (1983)(grant of certiorari).
42 104 S. Ct. at 1149.
"Id. at 1143-48. See Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966).
44 Id. at 1144-46.
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concluded that the probationer was not "in custody" and, therefore, had no right to
receive the Miranda warnings.'" Second, the Court determined that Murphy's probation
conditions did not contain an impermissible threat which penalized his exercise of the
privilege. 46
 Therefore, the Court concluded that Murphy's disclosures were not com-
pelled self-incriminations, and that he could not later invoke the privilege to prevent
the information given to the probation officer from being used against him.'"
The Murphy decision is significant in three respects. First, the case is important for
holding that Miranda warnings are not required to be given to probationers by probation
officers during noncustodial interviews. 48 By so holding, the Court in Murphy continued
the restrictive approach to Miranda protection that has prevailed in its recent decisions.49
Second, the Murphy opinion demonstrates that the Court is requiring a significant and
concrete threat to an individual upon exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination
before that individual can successfully object to the use of his confession at a subsequent
criminal trial. The implicit threat of probation revocation, according to the Murphy Court,
is not enough to excuse the failure to affirmatively claim the privilege." Finally, the
decision also has the practical effect of forewarning probationers that they have the
constitutional right to refuse to respond to their probation officers' questions if their
answers would be incriminating. 51
This casenote will examine and criticize the Supreme Court's decision in Murphy.
Section one examines the Supreme Court precedent interpreting the privilege against
self-incrimination existing prior to the Murphy decision. Section two then describes the
reasoning of the majority and dissenting opinions in Murphy. Section three analyzes these
opinions and contends that the Court's analogy of the probationer's situation to that of
a witness was not appropriately applied to the circumstances of Murphy's interview. This
section will argue that Murphy's interview involved sufficient threat to render his state-
ments involuntary. The final section of this casenote will examine the Court's conclusion
that Miranda warnings were not necessary in Murphy's situation. It will be maintained
45 Id. at 1146.
46
 Id. at 1146-48.
47 Id. at 1149.
4' Id. at 1146.
4 " See, e.g., Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492,495 (1977) (per curium) (person questioned in
police station held not to be in custody); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222,225-26 (1971) (statement
that is inadmissible in criminal trial as result of a failure to give Miranda warnings may be used to
impeach defendant's credibility).
w See 104 S. Ct. at 1146-48.
5' Id. at 1147 n.7; see also id. at 1150 (Marshall, J., dissenting). According to the Court, a
probationer's right to refuse to respond to questions asked by a probation officer depends upon
whether the answers would be incriminating in a criminal proceeding or would result in a probation
revocation proceeding. Id. at 1147 n.7. A probationer has the right to refuse to respond if the
answers would be incriminating in a criminal trial. Id. However, a probationer must respond to
questions relating to his probation status even when the answers might expose him to a probation
revocation hearing. Id. Therefore, a probationer does not have the right to refuse to respond if
the answers reveal that a condition of probation has been violated. Id.
In dicta, the Court explained that revocation of probation is not a criminal proceeding within
the meaning of the privilege. Id. Thus, probationers may be compelled, without violation of the
privilege, to answer questions that might result in revocation of probation. Id. If, however, the
answer to a question might lead both to criminal sanctions and to probation revocation, the
probationer may be compelled to respond if the state grants an express guarantee of immunity
from criminal liability. Id.
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that the Court's emphasis on the "custody" requirement rather than the "coercive"
atmosphere present in Murphy is not in accordance with the spirit of the Miranda decision.
1. THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION AND THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
STATEMENTS: A REVIEW OF PRECEDENT
The fifth amendment provides that a person cannot be compelled to be a witness
against himself in any criminal case. 52 One of the reasons the privilege against self-
incrimination was included in the Bill of Rights in 1790 was to protect people from
suffering sanctions for refusing to incriminate themselves." The framers of the Consti-
tution were aware of the English system at that time which presented a dilemma to
individuals faced with incriminating questions. If an individual answered truthfully, the
government could use the answer against him. 54 On the other hand, he could be charged
with perjury if he lied." Moreover, if the individual simply refused to answer, the
government could charge him with contempt." The fifth amendment privilege protects
against this dilemma by providing individuals with the right to refuse to respond to
incriminating questions posed by government officials in formal or informal proceed-
ings. 57
In general, the privilege against self-incrimination is not self-executing. That is, the
privilege does not protect people from all incriminating statements. 58 Rather, if an
individual desires the protection of the privilege, he must affirmatively assert it or he
will not later be considered to have been compelled within the meaning of the fifth
amendment. 55 For example, a person may claim the privilege by stating, "I refuse to
52 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
55 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). The privilege was elevated to a
constitutional right in order to avoid the "cruel dilemma of self-accusation, perjury, or contempt."
!d. For a discussion of the history of the privilege against self-incrimination see generally F.
GRISWOLD, Tiff FIFFII AMENDMENT TODAY (1955); Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional Histoty of
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763 (1935).
" Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
55 Id.
56 Id.
Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973).
55 The fifth amendment does not prohibit the government front asking incriminating questions.
United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1976) (the incriminating nature of a question
does not, by itself, excuse the requirement of a timely claim of the privilege); United States v.
. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 4'33 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("Nile Constitution does not forbid
the asking of criminative questions").
Moreover, the fifth amendment does not preclude a person from voluntarily giving incrimi-
nating information. In Miranda, the Court stated that "[v]olunteered statements of any kind are
not barred by the Fifth Amendment ..." 384 U.S. at 478. See also United States v. Washington, 431
U.S. 181, 187 (1977) ("Indeed, far from being prohibited by the Constitution, admissions of guilt
by wrongdoers, if not coerced, are inherently desirable [T]he Fifth Amendment proscribes
only self-incrimination obtained by a 'genuine compulsion of testimony ....' Absent some officially
coerced self-accusation, the Fifth Amendment privilege is not violated by even the most damning
admissions.").
59 Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 653 (1976). The Court has indicated that unless a
person objects, the government may assume that it is not eliciting incriminating testimony. Id. at
655. According to the Court, only the individual knows whether the disclosure sought may incrim-
inate hitn, and therefore, the burden lies with him to make a timely assertion of the privilege. Id.
If, instead, the Court noted, "he discloses the information sought, any incriminations properly are
viewed as not compelled." Id.
996	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 26:989
answer on the ground of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination." The
Supreme Court has noted that all that is necessary to invoke the privilege is an objection
stated in language that can be understood as an attempt to assert the privilege. 66 The
individual forfeits the protection of the privilege if he answers an incriminating question
instead of claiming the privilege against self-incrimination. 6 '
This general rule, however, is subject to exception when the individual is compelled
to give incriminating answers. An individual is "compelled" when his free will is over-
borne by official action and he has been denied the "free choice to admit, to deny, or to
refuse to answer."62 For example, the Court has held that a confession is compelled in
situations where an individual is threatened with a penalty for asserting the privilege, 66
or where an individual in custody is not advised of his rights before being interrogated."
There is no requirement that the privilege must be claimed when compulsion is used to
procure a confession. Rather, the fifth amendment confers protection by excluding the
use of the compelled confession as evidence in a subsequent criminal trial.
This section will examine Supreme Court precedent prior to Murphy which dealt
with the invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination and the admissibility of
confessions in two contexts. The Court's treatment of the privilege and the standards
for determining the admissibility of confessions will first be examined in the context of
custodial interrogation. Next, because the Murphy Court analogized the questioning of
probationers to in-court examination of witnesses, the section will review the effect of
the fifth amendment privilege on the admissibility of in-court statements.
A. Custodial Interrogation: The Privilege and Standards for the Admissibility of Confessions
Prior to 1964, the sole standard for the admissibility of a confession was its volun-
tariness under the fourteenth amendment guarantee of due process. 65 The due process
clause limits the type of conduct in which a state may engage to obtain evidence in a
criminal investigation. 66 Under this standard, a court reviews claims of compulsion by
examining the particular circumstances of an interrogation in order to determine
whether a confession is voluntary-67 Precedent suggests that the due process voluntariness
standard has three goals. The first goal is to ensure that convictions are based on reliable
and trustworthy evidence because compelled confessions are viewed as inherently un-
6° Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 165, 163-65 (1955) (references to "the first and fifth
amendment" and "the first amendment to the Constitution, supplemented by the fifth amendment"
in refusing to answer questions held sufficient to invoke the privilege's protection). See also Emspak
v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 194 (1955) (statement that refusal to answer was based "primarily
[on] the first amendment, supplemented by the fifth" held sufficient to invoke the privilege against
self-incrimination).
61 See supra note 4 and cases cited therein.
ca Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 241 (1941).
63 See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) (statements obtained from police officer
who was threatened with removal from police department if he claimed the privilege held to be
inadmissible).
" See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79 (statements obtained without warning a person in custody
of his rights conclusively presumed coerced and held to be inadmissible).
65 See supra notes 10-11.
66 See supra notes 10-11.
67 See, e.g., Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1968) (per curiam) (statements given
in police custody held to be involuntary under the totality of the circumstances).
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reliable. 65 The second possible goal of the voluntariness standard is deterrence of im-
proper police conduct which offends the community's sense of fair play and justice. 69
The third goal is to assure that a defendant's confession is the product of his free and
rational choice. 7 °
In assessing whether a confession is voluntary, the United States Supreme Court
has traditionally considered the "totality of the circumstances."" This analysis involves
an evaluation of various factors including the age of the accused, 72 his level of intelli-
gence, 73 whether the accused has been advised of his constitutional rights, 74 the length
of detention, 76 and the nature of the questioning. 76 Each of these factors plus all of the
surrounding circumstances are relevant in determining the voluntariness of the confes-
sion." If, after reviewing the totality of the circumstances, the Court determined that a
confession was involuntary, that confession was excluded from evidence at criminal
tria1, 78 For example, in Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 79 the Court held that several factors
rendered a confession involuntary under the totality of the circumstances: the accused
had a ninth-grade education; while in police custody he was not advised about his rights;
he was not provided with counsel despite his request for a lawyer; he was not provided
with food or medication; and he was interrogated by several officers in a small room
late at night and then again early in the morning. 8"
Apparently dissatisfied with its inability to articulate a clear and predictable definition
of voluntariness in the context of police interrogations, 81 the Supreme Court adopted a
sa Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547, 555 (1942) (the effect of telling a person of threats of mob
violence and questioning him continuously would make that person willing to make any statement
that the police wanted him to make).
99 Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 535 (1961) (police indicated that petitioner's wife would
be taken into custody if he did not confess); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 281 (1936)
(defendant beaten until he confessed).
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961) (when an individual's will has been
"overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired," the use of his confession
offends due process). See also Lynum v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 529 (1963) (defendant threatened
with deprivation of financial assistance for her minor children and told that they would be taken
away from her).
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223-27 (1972).
72 Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 598 (1947) (for several days police refused request of 15 year
old boy to see lawyer or mother).
" Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 196 (1956) (uneducated person of low mentality or mentally
ill).
74 Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 739-40 (1966).
" Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 230-31 (1939) (black defendants questioned by relays of
white officers all week and all of one night).
76 Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 148-51 (1943) (petitioner held incommunicado for
thirty-six hours, during which time, without sleep or rest, he had been interrogated by relays of
officers).
" Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1972) (no single factor is determinative
of the voluntariness of a confession).
78 Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 635 (1961) (due process precludes the use of invol-
untary statements).
79 390 U.S. 519 (1968).
85 Id. at 519-20.
s' See Kamisar, What is an I nvoluntaly' Confession? Some Continents on lnbau and Reid's Criminal
Interrogation and Confessions, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 728 (1963). Under this critique, the voluntariness
standard proved to be flexible and elusive: "The real reasons for excluding confessions have too
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standardized approach to these interrogations in the 1964 decision of Miranda v. Ari-
zona. 82 In Miranda, the Court held that statements elicited by law enforcement officers
during "custodial interrogation" were per se inadmissible unless full compliance with
certain procedural safeguards to protect the privilege against self-incrimination had been
demonstrated." In establishing this rule, the Miranda Court first observed that coercive
practices had often been used by the police in order to elicit confessions. 84
 The Court
also recognized that in-custody interrogation itself was an inherently coercive process
principally designed to overbear the free will of the accused." Finding that the due
process voluntariness test did not provide adequate protection for the constitutional
rights of suspects, the Court concluded that more stringent constitutional safeguards
were necessary to neutralize the coercive pressures inherent in custodial interrogation
so that suspects would have a "full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-
incrimination.""
Accordingly, the Miranda Court held that law enforcement officials must inform
persons held in custody of their rights prior to interrogation."7 The suspect must be
warned that he has the right to remain silent, that any statement he makes may be used
against him, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and if he cannot afford
a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent him if he so desires." If the person is not
warned, any resulting statements are inadmissible in a subsequent criminal prosecution
regardless of whether they were voluntarily given. 89 Custodial interrogation is, therefore,
one exception to the general rule that the privilege against self-incrimination must be
affirmatively claimed.
While Miranda required warnings to be given prior to custodial interrogation, the
Court was vague in spelling out what amounted to "custody.""() In Miranda, the Court
stated: "[b]y custodial interrogation we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way."" Aside from this statement, the Court in Miranda did
long been obscured by traditional language." Id. at 759. "Voluntary" and "involuntary" are words,
Kamisar noted, that needlessly obstruct clear thinking. Id. Indeed, the Court itself has referred to
the "voluntariness" standard as "an amphibian" which "purports at once to describe an internal
psychic state and to characterize that state for legal purposes." Columbe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S.
568, 604-05 (1961).
82 384 U.S. 436, 444-.45 (1964). Miranda sought to avoid problems inherent in the voluntariness
doctrine by establishing a per se exclusionary rule. See Comment, Michigan v. Tucker: A Warning
About Miranda, 17 ARIZ. L. Rev. 188, 190-91 (1975) (Miranda replaced subjective standard of
admissibility with objective test).
n 384 U.S. at 444-45. The defendant, accused of kidnapping and rape, had been taken to a
police station and interrogated for two hours without prior warnings of his constitutional rights.
Id. at 491-92. The Miranda Court held that use of the confession so obtained violated the privilege
against self-incrimination. Id. at 492.
84 Id. at 445-55.
85 Id. at 455-56.
86 Id. at 457, 468-69.
87 Id. at 467-68,479.
88 Id, at 467-73, 479.
89 Id. at 492. The Court noted that no statement would be considered a "product of [an
accused'sl free choice" without the warnings. Id. at 458.
9° See generally Comment, Custodial Interrogation, 35 TENN. L. REv. 604 (1968) (exploration of
factors relevant to determine custody).
384 U.S. at 444. The Court utilized similar phraseology in three additional places in discussing
when the right to be warned arises. Id. at 467, 477, 478.
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not further define situations when a person is entitled to warnings. 92 In a series of
subsequent cases, therefore, the Court has had to determine whether an interrogation
situation was "custodial" for purposes of receiving Miranda protection.93
In two early cases, the Court demonstrated that Miranda was not limited in appli-
cation to police station interrogations. In the 1968 case of Mathis v. United States, 94 a
federal tax investigator questioned an individual who was in prison on other charges. 93
The Court indicated that a person does not have to be "in custody" in connection with
the case under investigation in order to qualify for protection under Miranda.96 The
Court found that the appellant, Mathis, was in custody when questioned by the tax
investigator because he was in jail. 97 Tax investigators are required to give Miranda
warnings, the Court held, when the person under investigation is "in custody." Because
the privilege against self-incrimination had been infringed upon by the failure to give
warnings, the Court held that Mathis' statements were inadmissible at his criminal tria1. 98
A year later in the case of Orozco v. Texas," police officers questioned a suspect in
his bedroom at four o'clock in the morning about a murder without giving Miranda
warnings.m The Court determined that although Orozco was interrogated in familiar
surroundings, he was not free to leave when he was questioned. 101 The Court held that
because his freedom of action was significantly restricted, the use of Orozco's admissions
obtained without prior Miranda warnings was a violation of the fifth amendment. 1 °2
Subsequent cases demonstrated that the Court was making "custody," as defined in
Miranda, the sole determinant of when the right to receive warnings accrued. In the
1976 case of Beckwith v. United States, 1" the Court held that Miranda warnings are not
required if an investigation has merely "focused" on a suspect.w 4 Beckwith, the appellant
in the case, answered the questions of two IRS agents in his home and was later charged
with income tax evasion. 133 Although at the time of the interview the investigation had
"focused" on Beckwith, the Court noted that Miranda was not premised upon that factor
92 Miranda and its companion cases all involved interrogation in a police dominated atmosphere.
As these settings easily qualified as custody, no detailed analysis of being deprived of one's freedom
of action in a significant way was necessary.
95 For a review of the Court's post-Miranda interpretation of what constitutes custody see
Comment, Miranda v. Arizona: The Emerging Pattern, 12 U. RICH. L. REV. 409, 420 (1978).
94 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
" Id. at 2.
"' Id. at 4.
" Id. at 4-5.
98 Id. at 5.
99 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
1 (x) Id. at 325.
1 ° 1 Id. at 327. The Court noted that although Orozco was interrogated in familiar surroundings,
the interrogation was coercive:
At about 4 a.m., four police officers arrived at petitioner's boardinghouse, were ad-
mitted by an unidentified woman, and were told that petitioner was asleep in the
bedroom. All four officers entered the bedroom and began to question petitioner.
From the moment he gave his name, according to the testimony of one of the officers,
petitioner was not free to go where he pleased but was "under arrest."
Id. at 325.
102 Id. at 327.
1 " 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
' 114 Id. at 347.
'" Id. at 343.
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alone.'" The Court recognized that the Miranda Court's primary concern was with the
compulsive nature of custodial interrogation.' 07 In the absence of custody, as was the
case with the IRS investigation at issue in Beckwith, the Court held that no warnings were
necessary.' 05
The Supreme Court continued its literal construction of "custodial interrogation"
one year later in Oregon v. Mathiason.' 0  The defendant, Mathiason, had been named as
a prime burglary suspect."° At the request of state police officers, Mathiason went to
the state patrol office." During a closed door interview, the police officer told Mathiason
that he believed him to be guilty of the burglary and falsely informed him that his
fingerprints had been found at the scene." 2 Mathiason confessed and then was allowed
to leave." 3
In a per curiam opinion, the Court overturned the ruling of the Oregon Supreme
Court which had determined that Mathiason was questioned in the "coercive environ-
ment" of a police station and therefore was in "custody."" 4 The Court pointed out that
a custodial situation within the meaning of Miranda is not created merely because the
questioning takes place in the normally coercive environment of a police station. 15
According to the Court, because there was not a formal arrest or any restraint on freedom
of movement of the degree associated with formal arrest, the traditional coercive at-
mosphere of a police station was lacking."° Therefore, the Court concluded, no Miranda
warnings were required.
As the cases summarized above demonstrate," while the Supreme Court originally
took a flexible approach in determining when an interrogation by law enforcement
officials is custodial for purposes of receiving Miranda protection, in recent years the
Court has developed a "literal approach" to this issue. The Court has required actual
arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with formal arrest
before Miranda warnings are necessary. Where individuals questioned by the police are
not in custody, the admissibility of statements is determined by the pre-Miranda volun-
tariness standard.
106 1d. at 344.
107 Id at 345-47.
"" Id, at 348. The Court found that Beckwith was not in custody because he was not under
arrest and was interviewed in a friendly environment. Id.
1 "9 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam).
n" Id. at 493.
ill id.
" 2 Id. The Court held that the officer's false statement was not relevant for evaluating whether
custody was present for Miranda purposes. Id. at 496.
" 3 Id. at 493-94.
n 4 See id. at 494.
" 5 1d. at 495. The Court noted that:
fAl noncustodial situation is not converted to one in which Miranda applies simply
because a reviewing court concludes that, even in the absence of any formal arrest or
restraint on freedom of movement, the questioning took place in a "coercive environ-
ment" .... Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction
on a person's freedom as to render him "in custody". It was that sort of coercive
environment to which Miranda by its terms was made applicable, and to which it is
limited.
116 Id .
" 7 See supra notes 94-116 and accompanying text.
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B. The Privilege and Witnesses
Besides custodial interrogation, another exception to the general rule that the priv-
ilege against self-incrimination must be claimed exists where the state threatens a witness
with a penalty for the exercise of the privilege. The Supreme Court has indicated that
the ordinary witness" 8 does not have an absolute right to refuse to testify. 19 The
prosecution may freely interrogate a witness even on potentially incriminating matters. 12°
The Court has emphasized that the witness must assert the privilege and show that he
faces a realistic threat of self-incrimination.i" If a witness under legal compulsion to
testify makes disclosures instead of claiming the privilege, the Court has consistently
stated that the government has not compelled him to incriminate himself.' 22 In the 1977
decision of United States v. Washington, 123 for example, the Supreme Court held that a
witness called to testify before a grand jury was not compelled where he did not claim
the privilege against self-incrimination.' 24 The respondent in the case, Washington,
testified before a grand jury investigating a motorcycle theft in which he was impli-
cated.ln Later, he was indicted for grand larceny. 128 The Court held that Washington's
decision not to assert the privilege was voluntary even though the grand jury room
might have exerted some pressure on him. 127 The Court reasoned that the situation
contained other safeguards to offset the environment. 128 For example, Washington was
"" An ordinary witness is a person who gives evidence and testimony under oath in a judicial
proceeding. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1438 (5th ed. 1979).
n° Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972) (the privilege against self-incrimination
is the only substantial right afforded a witness before a grand jury who, once subpoenaed, has a
duty to appear and testify); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 93-94 (1964) (White, J.,
concurring) (the government has broad power to compel citizens to testify in court or before grand
juries).
' 2° United States v. iMonia, 317 U.S. 424, 433 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.. dissenting) ("[t]he Con-
stitution does not forbid the asking of criminative questions").
12 ' Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 473 (1976) (White, J., concurring) (a witness may not be
required to answer a question if there is some rational basis for believing that it will incriminate
him); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 78-79 (1973) (a witness protected by the privilege may
refuse to answer unless he is granted immunity from the use of his answers against him).
122 United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1970) (witnesses who give incriminating testimony
instead of asserting the privilege have not been compelled to answer in violation of the fifth
amendment); United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 (1943) ("The Amendment speaks of
compulsion. It does not preclude a witness from testifying voluntarily in matters which may incrim-
inate him. If, therefore, he desires the protection of the privilege, he must claim it or he will not
be considered to have been 'compelled' within the meaning of the Amendment.").
' 22 431 U.S. 181 (1977).
' 24 Id. at 188.
'2s
	
at 183. A stolen motorcycle was found in the rear of defendant's van after the police
stopped the van for a traffic offense. Id. The van was being driven by two of defendant's friends.
Id. The defendant told the grand jury that the motorcycle was in his van because he had stopped
to assist an unknown motorcyclist. Id. After he put the motorcycle in his van to take it for repairs,
the defendant testified, the van stalled and he went to a gas station to call his friends for help
leaving the unknown motorcyclist with the van. Id. The defendant said he waited at the gas station
and when he returned to the spot. were he had left the van, the van was not there. Id. The defendant
testifed that he assumed his friends had repaired the van and driven it away. Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 187-88.
' 2' Id. at 188.
1002	 BOSTON COI. I.FGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 26:989
advised of his right to remain silent at the outset of the proceeding.'" The Court
indicated, however, that warnings were not required to be given to a grand jury witness
even if the witness was a potential defendant.'"
The Court has held, however, that unless the state has granted "use immunity," 13 '
it may not compel testimony by imposing sanctions upon a witness for electing to exercise
his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.'" For example, the Court in
Lefkowitz v. Turley" held that the state of New York could not penalize government
contractors for claiming the privilege in grand jury proceedings by cancelling their
contracts with - the state. 13 ' In Turley, two state architects refused to waive the privilege
when testifying before a grand jury.'" State law provided that if contractors refused to
waive the privilege against self-incrimination, their existing state contracts would be
cancelled, and they would be barred from future state contracts for five years.'" The
statute was unconstitutional, the Court held, because that state sought to compel testi-
mony by imposing a sanction as the price of asserting the privilege.'" Thus, if the state
presents a witness with the choice of incriminating himself or suffering a penalty, and
the witness refuses to respond, the state cannot constitutionally carry out its threat to
penalize him,'" Likewise, the use of testimony compelled by the threat of punishment
for reliance on the privilege has also been prohibited by the Court. In Garrily v. New
jersey,'" a police officer was expressly informed during a grand jury investigation that
an assertion of the privilege would lead to his removal from the police department."'
The officer answered the questions and his admissions were used against him in a
subsequent criminal prosecution.'" The Court held that the choice given Garrity either
to forfeit his job or to incriminate himself constituted coercion. 1 k 2 Because the testimony
was compelled, the statements were inadmissible as evidence in a subsequent criminal
trial.' j 9
Thus, although the Supreme Court has generally held that a witness must claim the
privilege, that general rule is subject to exception when the state threatens the exercise
' 29 1d.
10 1d.
13 ' Id. When a witness is granted "use immunity," he may be compelled to testify but his
testimony is prohibited from use as evidence in a subsequent criminal prosecution. See Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972). The witness can be prosecuted but the evidence must be
secured from an independent source. Id. at 460-62.
132 See Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 809 (1977) (removal of political party officer
because he refused to waive his privilege against self-incrimination held to violate fifth and four-
teenth amendment rights); Uniformed Sanitation Men v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U.S.
280, 284-85 (1968) (proceedings which present public employees with a choice between losing their
jobs or surrendering their privilege against self-incrimination held to violate the fifth amendment);
Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 278-79 (1968) (state dismissal of police officer for refusal to
relinquish his privilege held unconstitutional).
l" 414 U.S. 70 (1973).
' 34 Id. at 85.
133 Id. at 75-76.
," Id. at 71.
137 Id. at 82-83.
158 1d. at 85. See also Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977).
139 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
140 Id, at 494,
' 41 Id. at 495.
142 Id. at 500.
143 Id.
July 1985]
	
CASENOTES	 1003
of the privilege against self-incrimination with legal sanctions. As the Court has indicated,
if a witness relies on the privilege, the state cannot carry out the threat.'" Conversely,
if a witness responds, the state cannot use the testimony against him. 1 f5 Even though the
witness has not claimed the privilege, the statements are inadmissible because the state
has, in effect, undermined the witness' free choice and compelled his testimony. Yet, the
Court has not established specific guidelines as to what a witness is required to prove to
establish that the state threatened him. As Garrity indicates, however, an express threat
of penalty is sufficient to render any resulting statements compelled." 6
In summary, the precedent dealing with the invocation of the privilege and admis-
sibility of confessions has been presented both in the context of custodial interrogation
and witness investigation. In both contexts, compelled confessions are inadmissible. A
confession resulting from custodial interrogation is deemed compelled if Miranda warn-
ings are not given. Statements are deemed compelled if a state threatens a witness for
exercising the privilege. In Minnesota v. Murphy," 7 the Supreme Court applied both these
lines of precedent in determining the admissibility of a confession in the context of a
probation officer's interrogation of a probationer.' 45
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S REASONING IN MURPHY
A. The Majority Opinion
In a six to three decision the Supreme Court held in Minnesota v. Murphy that a
statement obtained by a probation officer in a noncustodial setting from a probationer
who failed to assert the privilege against self-incrimination may be introduced against
him in a subsequent criminal prosecution. 349 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
analogized the status of a probationer to that of a witness before a grand jury who must
claim the fifth amendment privilege in order to gain its protection. The Court further
Found that the three exceptions where no affirmative assertion of the privilege is required
were inapplicable in the probation interview context.
The Court began its analysis by examining the extent of the protection of the
privilege against self-incrimination. 159 According to the Court, the privilege extends to
both civil and criminal proceedings whether formal or informal. 151 Furthermore, the
Court recognized that a person who is imprisoned or on probation at the time he makes
incriminating statements is to be accorded the same protection as any other person." 2
Having thus acknowledged that under appropriate circumstances probationers may
be entitled to protection against self-incrimination, the Court addressed the question of
whether Murphy's probationary status, in itself, constituted a situation meriting fifth
amendment protection. The Court began by analogizing Murphy's probation obligations
l" See supra notes 133-38 and accompanying text.
115 See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
"6 Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500.
147 104 S. Ct. 1136 (1984).
las Id.
"9 1d. at 1149.
' 5° Id. at 1141-42.
151 Id. at 1142.
' 52 Id. (citing Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 316 (1970) (prison inmates may not be
compelled to furnish statements that might later incriminate them)).
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to the obligation of a witness.'" First, the Court noted that Murphy's obligation to appear
before his probation officer and answer questions truthfully did not in itself convert his
statements into compelled ones. 154 According to the Court, Murphy's duty was similar
to that of a witness who is subpoenaed, sworn to tell the truth and obliged to answer on
pain of contempt.'"
In discussing how a witness can invoke protection of the privilege, the Court stated
that as a general rule, if a witness desires not to incriminate himself, he must claim the
privilege rather than answer.'" Failure to assert the privilege in a timely manner, the
Court noted, indicates that an answer is voluntary since the witness is free to claim the
privilege. 157
The Court then considered whether this rule might give way in situations where
the government has substantial reason to believe that incriminating answers will result.'"
The Court observed that the Constitution does not forbid the government from asking
incriminating questions.'" Pointing out that its prior cases do not suggest that the
incriminating nature of a question excuses a timely assertion of the privilege, 166 the Court
concluded that the general rule still applies even when the witness is confronted with
questions that the government should reasonably expect to elicit incriminating evi-
dence.'"
At this point in its evaluation in Murphy, the Court declared that it had found no
basis for not applying the ordinary witness rule to probationers. 162 Because Murphy had
not claimed the privilege, the Court stated that his responses could not he regarded as
compelled unless some factor existed which undermined his free choice and compelled
him to speak. 165 The Court therefore devoted the remainder of its opinion to an ex-
amination of three exceptions where no affirmative assertion of the privilege has been
required: custodial interrogation;'" state threats penalizing the assertion of the privi-
lege; 165 and the filing of gambling tax returns.' 66
153 104 S. Ct. at 1142-43.
154 Id. at 1142.
Id.
' 66 Id. (citing Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 654 (1976); United States v. Kordel, 397
U.S. I, 7-10 (1970); Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 112-13 (1927)).
in Id. (citing United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 10 (1970) (failure to claim the privilege "leaves
[an individual I in no position to complain [later] that he was compelled to give testimony against
himself ")).
Id, at 1142-43.
155 Id. at 1143. In dicta in Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 559 (1980), the Court suggested
that when a government official has "substantial reason to believe that [the] requested disclosures
are likely to be incriminating," the privilege need not be affirmatively claimed. The Murphy Court
distinguished this statement by citing to Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in United States v.
Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 433 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("the Constitution does not forbid the
asking of crirninative questions.").
16" 104 S. Ct. at 1143 (citing United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1976) (plurality
opinion)).
i 61 Irl. at 1143.
L62 Id.
' 63 Id.
L 64 Id. at 1143-46.
163 Id. at 1 I 46-49.
166 Id. at 1149.
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In considering the custodial interrogation exception, the Court observed that the
isolation of a suspect in police custody contains inherently compelling pressures. In order
to compensate for this compulsion, the Court stated that Miranda requires police officers
to warn a suspect who is in custody of his right to remain silent and the consequences
of a failure to do 50. 167 The Court emphasized that the requirements of Miranda do not
apply outside the context of custodial interrogations.I 68
In determining whether a person on probation is "in custody" for purposes of the
Miranda protections, the Supreme Court examined the four factors advanced by the
Minnesota Supreme Court in support of its holding that a Miranda-like approach should
be taken with no affirmative claim of the privilege required.' 69 First, the Court considered
the ability of a probation officer to compel a probationer to attend meetings and answer
questions truthfully.'" The Court found this factor analogous to the situation of a grand
jury witness who must appear and answer questions truthfully or else affirmatively claim
the fifth amendment privilege — all without benefit of Miranda warnings."' Indicating
that Murphy was subjected to even less intimidating pressure than a witness, the Court
declined to require that Miranda warnings be given on the basis of this factor.'"
The Court also dismissed the second factor advanced by the Minnesota Supreme
Court, that the probation officer consciously sought incriminating statements.'" The
Court noted that an investigation that focuses on an individual does not trigger the need
for Miranda warnings in noncustodial settings. 174 The intent of the probation officer, the
Court stated, had no bearing on the outcome of the case)"
Continuing its rejection of the Minnesota Supreme Court's holding that Murphy's
probation interview was analogous to custodial interrogation, the Court considered the
third factor, that Murphy was unaware of the questions the probation officer was going
to ask and therefore could not seek counsel before attending the meeting. 176 The Court
declared that probationers should expect questions about prior criminal conduct while
on probation.'" According to the Court, Murphy could have reasonably concluded from
the probation officer's letter suggesting futher treatment, that she suspected him of a
crime. 178 The Court concluded that a probationer's situation is not significantly different
from that of grand jury witnesses who are unaware of the scope of an investigation.'"
The Court next considered the fourth factor discussed by the Minnesota Supreme
Court — that there were no observers to guard against abuse or trickery. 180 The Court
'"7 hi. at 1144.
168 hi. The Murphy Court stated: "We have consistently held, however, that this extraordinary
safeguard 'does not apply outside the context of the inherently coercive custodial interrogations
for which it was designed.'' Id. (quoting Roberts v. United States. 445 U.S. 552, 560 (1980)).
16" Id. at 1144-45. See State v. Murphy, 324 N.W.2d 340. 344 (Minn. 1982). For a full discussion
of the reasoning of the Minnesota Supreme Court see supra note 40.
' 7° 104 S. Ct. at 1144. See State v. Murphy, 324 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn. 1982).
In 104 S. Ct. at 1144 (citing United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 186 (1977)).
172 104 S. Ct. at 1144.
'"14. at 1145. See State v. Murphy, 324 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn. 1982).
174 104 S. Ct. at 1145 (citing Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976)). See supra notes
155-58 and accompanying text.
05 104 S. Ct. at 1145.
176 1d. See State v. Murphy, 324 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn, 1982).
17 104 S. Ct. at 1145.
'" Id.
179 Id.
1 " Id. See State v. Murphy, 324 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn. 1982)..
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examined the facts of the Murphy case to determine whether the probation officer's
actions would have led a reasonable probationer to believe that his statements to her
would remain confidential.'" There was no indication, the Court observed, that Mur-
phy's probation officer was not concerned with the need for further treatment.'" Fur-
thermore, the Court stated, Murphy should have known that the probation officer was
required to report his confession.' 83 The Court suggested that Murphy was not misled
by any expectation that his statements would remain confidential. This was evidenced,
the Court explained, by his apparent failure to express surprise on being informed that
his statements would be made available to the police. 184
After examining the four factors advanced by the Minnesota Supreme Court in
support of the conclusion that Murphy's interrogation by his probation officer was
analogous to custodial interrogation, the Court conducted its own comparison of cus-
todial interrogation and probation interviews. The Court concluded that meetings by
probationers with their supervisors are not akin to custodial interrogation. 185
 While
custodial interrogation conveys the message that the suspect must confess, the Court
observed that probation meetings are arranged at mutually agreeable times and are
unlikely to convey the impression that the probationer has no choice but to submit to
the probation officer's will.'" While custodial arrest thrusts a person into an unfamiliar
environment, the Court noted that probation meetings are at a regular time and place
so the probationer does not suffer the disadvantage of an unfamiliar environment.'"
Moreover, the Court observed, Murphy was not physically restrained and was permitted
to leave at the end of the meeting. According to the Court, the pressures on Murphy
were insignificant compared to the pressures on a suspect in police custody.'" Thus, the
Court concluded that because the probation interview is not custodial in nature, the
probation officer was not required to warn Murphy of his Miranda rights.'"
The Court also conducted its own evaluation of whether a person on probation is
"in custody" for purposes of the Miranda protections. Although conceding that Murphy
was subject to a number of restrictive conditions and would be regarded as "in custody"
for purposes of federal habeas corpus,'" the Court noted that "custody" for Miranda
181 104 S. Ct. at 1145.
' 92 Id.
l83 Id.
,84 Id.
i" 5 1d. at 1146.
"6 Id. at 1145.
187 Id. According to the Court, Murphy's regular meetings with his probation officer should
have served to familarize him with her and her office and to insulate him from psychological
intimidation that might overbear his desire to claim the privilege. Id.
' 98
 Id. at 1146.
,89 Id.
'99
	 at 1144. See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963) (state prisoner who has
been placed on parole under the "custody and control" of a parole board is "in custody" within the
meaning of the federal habeas corpus statute). Habeas corpus is a writ directed to a person detaining
another and commanding him to produce the body of the person detained. The writ permits a
prisoner to challenge the legality of detention or imprisonment on constitutional grounds. A federal
court has jurisdiction under the federal habeas corpus statute to grant a writ of habeas corpus "to
a prisoner ... in custody • .. in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."
28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1982). The habeas corpus jurisdiction statute implements the constitutional
command that the writ of habeas corpus be made available. U.S. Cos:sr. art. I, § 9. "The privilege
July 1985j	 CASENOTES	 1007
purposes is a much narrower standard requiring formal arrest or restraint on freedom
of movement of the degree similar to that associated with formal arrest.'" The Court
found that Murphy's situation did not meet this definition of "in custody" because
Murphy was not under arrest, nor, in the Court's opinion, was his freedom of movement
restrained in the degree associated with an arrest.'" Therefore, according to the Court,
Miranda did not apply.'"
The Court next considered the second situation where no assertion of the privilege
against self-incrimination is required, when an individual faces a threat of legal sanction
if the privilege is claimed.'" Murphy's argument, the Court noted, was that because he
was required to be truthful to his probation officer in "all matters," invocation of the
privilege would lead to probation revocation. 19" The Court then examined prior cases
where individuals were threatened with a penalty for claiming the privilege, and con-
cluded that the government acts impermissibly when it either expressly or implicitly
asserts that invocation of the privilege will be penalized.'"
The Court then considered whether the state of Minnesota presented Murphy with
the impermissible choice of making incriminating statements to the officer or jeopardiz-
ing his probationary status. First, the Court noted that the Minnesota Supreme Court
had not determined whether Murphy's probation conditions contained an impermissible
threat.'" Therefore, the Court itself examined Murphy's probation condition that he
respond truthfully to all questions.' 9" The Court interpreted this condition as merely
proscribing false statements.' 99 According to the Court, this requirement did not mandate
that Murphy answer every question his probation officer asked.") Rather, the Court
declared, Murphy was free to decline to answer any question that might have been
incriminating, or to seek clarification of this probation condition if he did not understand
his obligation."'
After concluding that Murphy's probation conditions did not contain an impermis-
sible threat, the Court also found that there was no reasonable basis for concluding that
the state attempted to attach the penalty of probation revocation to the exercise of the
privilege against self-incrimination. 202 First, the Court pointed out that Murphy was not
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion,
the public safety may require it." Id.
104 S. Ct. at 1144 (citing Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam)).
in Id. at 1144.
19 ' Id. at 1146.
1 " For a discussion of this line of precedent, see supra notes 132-46 and accompanying text.
195 104 S. Ct. at 1146.
'°6 Id. at 1146-47 (citing Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 806 (1977); Uniformed
Sanitation Men v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280, 283-84 (1968); Gardner v. Broderick,
392 U.S. 273, 278-79 (1968); Garrity v. New jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 498 (1967)). See infra notes 282-
91 and accompanying text for criticism of the holding as contrary to the precedent cited.
' 97 104 S. Ct. at 1148.
' 98 Id. at 1147-48.
1"9 Id. at 1148. According to the Court, "Murphy's probation condition proscribed only false
statements; it said nothing about his freedom to decline to answer particular questions and certainly
contained no suggestion that his probation was conditional on his waiving his Fifth Amendment
privilege with respect to further criminal prosecution." Id.
21" Id.
201 Id.
202 Id.
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expressly informed during the meeting that assertion of the privilege would result in
probation revocation. 2" The Court emphasized that Murphy's subjective belief that his
probation might be revoked if he claimed the privilege was not objectively reasonable.° 4
Under the Minnesota revocation statute,20 ' the Court noted, the probation revocation
process is not automatic. 206 Thus, the Court reasoned, even if the probation officer had
recommended revocation, Murphy was still entitled to a full hearing. 207 The Court added
that under its prior decisions, the state could not constitutionally carry out a threat of
probation revocation.208 Under Murphy's circumstances, however, the Court concluded
that Murphy's apprehension that the state would revoke his probation was not reasonably
perceived. 209 Consequently, the Court concluded that he was not deterred from claiming
the privilege by an impermissible threat of state sanction. 210
In the final section of its analysis, the Court summarily examined the gambling tax
exception to the general rule that the privilege must be affirmatively claimed. According
to the Court, this exception was inapplicable to the situation facing probationers. Because
individuals would identify themselves as gamblers by filing gambling tax returns, the
Court explained, the privilege may be exercised in such cases by failing to file a return
rather than affirmatively asserting the privilege. 2 " Unlike taxpayers who would incrim-
inate themselves by claiming the privilege at the time gambling tax disclosures were
requested, according to the Court, probationers will not ordinarily have the problem of
claiming the privilege at the time disclosures are requested. 212
In conclusion, the Court determined that Murphy was not faced with a coercive
situation which prevented him from asserting the privilege. Because Murphy had not
claimed the privilege, the Court concluded that his disclosures to his probation officer
were voluntary. Therefore, the Court held that Murphy's statments could be introduced
by the prosecution in his murder trial."
2"" Id, The Court compared Murphy's situation to a case in which police officers were expressly
informed by a grand jury that an assertion of the privilege would result in the imposition of a
penalty. Id. See Garrity v. New jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967). See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying
text; infra notes 284-91.
204 104 S. Ct. at 1148.
"5 MINN. STAT. § 609.14 (1982).
2 "6 104 S. Ct. at 1148. The statute reads in relevant part:
When it appears that the defendant has violated any of the conditions of his probation
... the court may without notice revoke ... probation and direct that the defendant
be taken into immediate custody.
The defendant shall ... be notified in writing ... of the ground alleged .... If
such grounds are brought in issue by the defendant, a summary hearing shall be held
thereon at which he is entitled to be heard and to be represented by counsel.
MINN. STAT. § 609.14 (1982).
207 104 S. Ct. at 1148. See infra note 311 and accompanying text.
208 104 S. Ct. at 1148 (citing Letkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973); Uniformed Sanitation
Men v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280, 284 (1968); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273,
277-78 (1968)).
709 Id.
ld. at 1149,
2 " Id. (citing Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S.
39 (1968); Grasso v. United States. 375 U.S. 67 (1968)).
212 Id.
213 Id.
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B. The Dissenting Opinion
In an opinion joined by Justice Stevens, and in part by Justice Brennan, 214 Justice
Marshall dissented from the Court's conclusion that Murphy's constitutional rights had
not been violated. 215 The dissent began, however, by agreeing with much of the majority's
analysis of the probationer's privilege against self-incrimination. 216 The dissent agreed
that a probationer's right to refuse to respond to questions depends upon whether his
answers would be incriminating in a criminal proceeding or in a probation revocation
proceeding."' If the answers might expose the probationer to criminal prosecution, the
dissent agreed with the majority that he has the right to refuse to respond unless granted
immunity from the use of his answers in a subsequent criminal trial. 218 To an even
greater extent than the Court, however, the dissent emphasized that a probationer does
not have the right to refuse to answer questions relating to his probation status even
when his answers might expose him to a probation revocation hearing. 2 1 9 The dissent
explained this distinction by noting that the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination applies only to criminal proceedings. 220 Because probation revocation hear-
ings are not criminal proceedings, the dissent reasoned, the privilege does not protect
the probationer against the use of compelled incriminations at revocation hearings. 221
The dissent, however, rejected the majority's conclusion that Murphy forfeited his
privilege against self-incrimination. Instead, according to the dissent, Murphy's failure
to claim the privilege was excused because he was faced with both an impermissible state
threat and an inherently coercive situation. 222 Beginning with the issue of the state threat
of probation revocation, Justice Marshall agreed with the majority that if a state threatens
an individual with a sanction for asserting the privilege against self-incrimination, his
responses are deemed compelled. 223 The dissent, however, rejected the majority's con-
clusion that Murphy had to prove that he was deterred from claiming the privilege by
a "reasonably perceived" threat of state penalty. 224 According to the dissent, in the past
214 Justice Brennan did not join in Part II-A of Marshall's dissent. In this section, Justice
Marshall reviewed prior cases and argued that the Court has adhered to the principle that a person
forfeits the privilege only when several factors that support the principle are implicated. Id. at
1154-58 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See infra note 232.
2 " Id. at 1149 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
216 Id. at 1150 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
217 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). In a footnote, the Court had summarily addressed the issue of
when a probationer has the right to refuse to answer questions asked by his probation officer. Id.
at 1147 n.7.
210 Id. at 1150 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also id. at 1147 n.7.
219 Id. at 1150 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 1150-51 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
223 Id. at 1151 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
224 Id. at 1152-54 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent noted two reasons for refusing to accept
the majority's burden of proof. Justice Marshall's first concern was that it would be difficult for the
threatened person to prove that, but for the threat, he would have refused to speak. Id. at 1152
(Marshall, J., dissenting). For instance, many persons are not aware that a state could not consti-
tutionally carry out a threat to penalize exercise of the privilege, rd. lf, however, the prosecution
shows that the threat was idle, the defendant would have a difficult time demonstrating that the
threat induced his confession. Id. at 1152 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The second concern ad-
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the Court had only required a defendant to prove that the state threatened him and
that he relied on that threat for testimony to be deemed compelled. 225
Justice Marshall also rejected the majority's conclusion that the terms of Murphy's
probation did not contain an impermissible threat. 226 The dissent interpreted Murphy's
probation condition "to be truthful' in all matters" as a duty to answer all questions
presented by his probation officer. 227 Maintaining that these instructions presented Mur-
phy with a constitutionally impermissible choice of either incriminating himself by an-
swering or having.his probation revoked for failing to obey the condition, 228
 the dissent
concluded that the threat of probation revocation deprived Murphy of free choice. 229
Therefore, according to the dissent, the state should not have been permitted to use
Murphy's statements against him in a criminal proceeding. 230
Justice Marshall also contended that Murphy's confession should not be admitted
for a second reason — the state did not show that Murphy voluntarily and intelligently
waived his right to remain silent. 23i According to the dissent, in previous decisions the
Court has not applied the principle that failure to claim the privilege results in forfeiture
where the situation impairs the individual's ability to intelligently exercise his rights. 232
In such situations, Justice Marshall maintained that the Court has required a showing
by the state that the defendant knew his constitutional rights and freely waived them. 233
dressed by the dissent was that the state should not be allowed to use the confession if the defendant
relies upon the threat and incriminates himself because the state's initial attempt to coerce self-
incriminating statements is constitutionally offensive. Id. at 1152 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
225 Id.
226 Id. at 1152-54 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See id. at 1148-49; supra notes 194-210 and accom-
panying text.
227 104 S. Ct. at 1153 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See id. at 1148; supra notes 198-201 and
accompanying text. The dissent rejected the Court's interpretation of Murphy's probation condition
as a duty not to lie. 104 S. Ct. at 1153 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that the context
of the phrase is important in interpreting the condition. Id. First, Justice Marshall noted that the
duty to be truthful is the first term of the probation conditions. Id. Second, the dissent indicated
that the phrase is capitalized; "BE TRUTHFUL." Id. Third, Justice Marshall noted that the phrase
is immediately preceded by an emphasized instruction "to obey strictly the following conditions."
Id.
228 Id. The dissent criticized the Court for hesitating to find that Murphy would have been
exposed to revocation of his probation for refusing to answer the probation officer's questions
solely because the Minnesota state courts did not reach the issue of the construction of Murphy's
probation conditions. Id. at 1153 n.10 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The proper course, the dissent
suggested, would have been to remand the case to the Minnesota Supreme Court to allow it to
construe the probation condition. Id,
229 Id. at 1154 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
2" Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
291 Id. at 1154-61 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
252
	 id, at 1156-61 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the Court has applied
the forfeiture principle in a variety of contexts where the individual's ability to assert the privilege
is not impaired. Id. at 1157 & n.20 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Washington,
431 U.S. 181 (1977); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam); Beckwith v. United
States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976); United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931); Vajtauer v. Commis-
sioner of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103 (1927)). However, the dissent noted that the Court has not
adhered to the general rule that a privilege not claimed is lost when there was a paucity of safeguards
to protect the person's ability to exercise his rights. Id. at 1158 & n.21 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955);
Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137 (1949)).
299 Id. at 1158 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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According to the dissent, the circumstances under which Murphy was interrogated
impaired his ability to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination."4 The dissent
contended that it was unfair to charge Murphy with the knowledge that he had the right
to refuse to respond to his probation officer's questions."' According to Justice Marshall,
at the time Murphy was questioned by the probation officer the scope of that right was
clearly ambiguous. 296 Moreover, the dissent contended, Murphy's probation officer
abused the trust that is implicit in the probation relationship by using deception to elicit
a confession from Murphy. 237 Under these circumstances, Justice Marshall maintained,
the state had the duty of proving that Murphy was aware of his rights and that he freely
waived them."' Because the state failed to meet this burden of proof, the dissent
concluded, the confession should not have been admitted. 2"
III. WERE MURPHY'S STATEMENTS PROPERLY ADMITTED?: A CRITIQUE OF THE COURT'S
REASONING
In Murphy, the Supreme Court held that probation officers are not required to give
Miranda warnings before attempting to obtain incriminating statements from probation-
ers who are not in custody."° The Court indicated that statements obtained from pro-
bationers who fail to assert the privilege against self-incrimination may be admitted as
evidence against them in subsequent criminal prosecutions."' The Court held that the
statements are inadmissible, however, if the responses are not voluntar y.242
The next section of this casenote will analyze the reasoning employed by the Murphy
Court. First, this casenote will evaluate the Court's conclusion that Murphy was not
deterred from claiming the privilege against self-incrimination. This casenote will submit
2" See id. at 1158-60 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
255 Id. at 1159 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
2" Id. at 1158-59 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that the Solicitor General,
appearing as amicus curiae, did not correctly state the rights that could have been asserted by
Murphy when questioned by his probation officer. Id. at 1150 (Marshall, j., dissenting). The Solicitor
General argued that the government could exert more pressure upon a probationer to make
incriminating statements than it could exert upon a person who had not been convicted of a crime.
Id. at 1159 n.23 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Murphy, the Supreme Court expressly rejected that
proposition. Id. at 1142. The Court held that a person does not lose the protection of the privilege
by reason of his conviction of a crime. Id. The dissent commented that if the lawyers representing
the government did not know the scope of a probationer's privilege against self-incrimination, it is
unlikely that Murphy could have known that he had the right to refuse to answer the probation
officer's questions. Id. at 1159 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
237
	 at 1159-60 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall observed that the environment in
which Murphy was interviewed impaired his ability to claim his right to remain silent. Id. at 1159
(Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent conceded that the discussion between probationers and
probation officers would not be as coercive as between police officers and suspects. Id. (Marshall,
j., dissenting). The dissent noted, however, that there exists a relationship of confidentiality between
a probationer and his probation officer which is absent from the police-suspect relationship. The
danger, the dissent urged, is that a probation officer can elicit admissions from a probationer that
the probationer would not be likely to make to a hostile police investigator. Id. at 1160 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
2" Id.
2" Id. at 1161 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
240
	 id. at 1144-46. See supra notes 149-213 and accompanying text.
241 Id. at 1149.
242 Id. at 1143.
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that the Court's witness analogy was not appropriately applied to the circumstances of
Murphy's interrogation by his probation officer and that. Murphy's interview involved
sufficient threat to render his statements inadmissible. Second, this casenote will contend
that the spirit of the Miranda decision and the considerations underlying the privilege
against self-incrimination mandate that even though Murphy was not technically in
custody, he should have received warnings of his rights.
A. The Witness Analogy
Throughout its opinion, the Court used the example of a witness before a grand
jury as an applicable analogy to Murphy's situation. 2" The Court reasoned that a pro-
bationer has the same duty as a witness either to claim the privilege or lose its protec-
tion.244 Because Murphy failed to claim the privilege before making incriminating state-
ments to his probation officer, the Court held that Murphy forfeited his right to object
to the use of his admissions at his murder prosecution. 243 There are significant differ-
ences between the status of a witness and the status of a probationer, however, which
make the Court's analogy between the two situations inappropriate. Because the Court's
analogy was fundamentally flawed, the Murphy Court's application of the forfeiture
principle to the probationer's situation was ill-considered.
I. "Claim it or lose it": The Court's Adherence to the Forfeiture Principle
A witness is subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury, sworn to tell the truth and
obligated to answer under pain of contempt.246 The Court has held that this legal
obligation to appear and give testimony does not alone render any resulting incriminating
responses compelled in violation of the fifth amendment."' Rather, the Court has made
clear that when a witness desires not to make incriminating disclosures, he must affir-
matively assert the privilege. 2" If the witness fails to claim the privilege, and instead
2 3 As to the general obligation to appear and answer questions truthfully, the Court stated
that:
Murphy was in no better position than the ordinary witness at a trial or before a grand
jury who is subpoenaed, sworn to tell the truth, and obligated to answer on the pain
of contempt . . . Murphy [was subjected] to less intimidating pressure than is imposed
on grand jury witnesses, who are sworn to tell the truth and placed in a setting
conducive to truthtelling .... Murphy's situation was ... indistinguishable from that
facing . . . grand jury witnesses who are unaware of the scope of an investigation or
that they are considered potential defendants .... [Legal compulsion to attend meet-
ing and to answer questions truthfully] is indistinguishable from that felt by any witness
who is required to appear and give testimony, and, as we have already made clear, it
is insufficient to excuse Murphy's failure to exercise the privilege in a timely manner.
Id. at 1146-48.
2" Id. at 1143. See supra text accompanying notes 156-62.
24'
	 S. Ct. at 1149. See supra text accompanying notes 163 & 213.
24" 104 S. Ct. at 1142. See also liranzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682 (1973) (all citizens
obligated to respond to a grand jury subpoena and answer questions relevant to a criminal inves-
tigation).
247 Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648,654 (1976) ("if a witness under compulsion to testify
makes disclosures instead of claiming the privilege, the government has not 'compelled' him to
incriminate himself").
246
	 States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 (1943) (a witness must claim the privilege if he
desires the privilege's protection); see supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
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makes incriminating responses, he has forfeited his rights and cannot later object to the
use of his statements at tria1.249
The Supreme Court's adherence to the principle that a witness' failure to claim the
privilege in a timely manner results in forfeiture, reflects a balancing of the individual's
privilege against self-incrimination against the government's need for information. 25°
The government has an important interest in being able to use confessions as reliable
evidence of guilt in prosecuting criminals. 251 Thus, the government is not prohibited
from asking a witness incriminating questions and using the answers to those questions
in a subsequent criminal prosecution. 252 The burden lies with the witness to object to
the disclosure of potentially incriminating information by claiming the privilege prior to
answering a question. 253 If the witness claims the privilege, the government may not
compel him to answer. 254 An accommodation of the competing interests of the individual
and the state is thus achieved by leaving to the individual the burden of first objecting
to incriminating questions. 255
The Court has applied the principle that witnesses forfeit the privilege against self-
incrimination if they fail to claim it when the circumstances of the case show that the
witness' decision not to assert the privilege was voluntary.2 ' 6 Although the atmosphere
of the jury room may exert some pressure on witnesses, the Court has noted that there
are safeguards which protect the witness' ability to assert the privilege. 257 One such
safeguard is the opportunity to consult with counse1. 258 After being served with a sub-
poena to testify before a grand jury, the witness is given sufficient warning that potentially
incriminating questions may be asked. 259 Because grand juries question witnesses about
249 United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 (1943).
2" Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655 (1976) (insistence upon a claim of privilege
reflects an appropriate accommodation of the fifth amendment privilege and the generally appli-
cable principle that the government has the right to everyone's testimony).
2" Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 584-85 (1884) (confessions are traditionally regarded as excep-
tionally reliable evidence of guilt).
252 United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 571-75 (1976).
255 Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655 (1976).
ssi Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 806 (1977).
255 Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655 (1976).
256 See Murphy, 104 S. Ct. at 1156-58 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Washing-
ton, 431 U.S. 181 (1977); Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976); United States v. Kordel,
397 U.S. 1 (1970)).
257 United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 183-84 (1977). See also United States v. Man-
dujano, 425 U.S. 564, 579-80 (1976) (Miranda inapplicable in the witness context because interrog-
ation before a grand jury unlikely to involve physical brutality or psychological techniques designed
to coerce self-incrimination).
258
	
United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 189 (1977) (defendant had been afforded
opportunity to seek legal advice before testifying); United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 148
(1931) (when defendant consulted with an attorney just before interview with revenue agent, his
failure to invoke the privilege as a justification for his refusal to answer resulted in waiver). The
Supreme Court has recognized that legal advice is essential to safeguard many constitutional rights.
See Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 466 (1975) (lawyer not in contempt for advising client to assert
the fifth amendment privilege). For a view that the right to counsel is the pivotal right for a grand
jury witness see Comment, The Rights of a Witness Before a Grand jury, 1967 DUKE L.J. 97, 122-32.
259 Brief for Appellant at 23, Minnesota v. Murphy, 104 S. Ct. 1136 (1984). See Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1973) (grand jury's task is to inquire into existence of possible criminal
conduct); see also Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 274 (1968) (where a policeman was advised
that the grand jury proposed to examine him concerning the performance of his official duties).
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particular crimes, witnesses have reason to consult with counsel before testifying in order
to plan how to respond to incrimininating questions. Furthermore, in some cases, grand
jury witnesses have been provided with a lawyer. 26° For example, the defendant in United
States v. Washington 261 was called to testify before a grand jury about a crime in which he
was implicated. 262 In ruling that the incriminating answers made by the defendant before
the grand jury could be used against him, the Court stressed that several factors indicated
that Washington's ability to exercise his rights had not been impaired. 263 One such factor
was the defendant's freedom to seek legal advice prior to the hearing. 264 The Court also
emphasized that the defendant had been informed at the start of the hearing that a
lawyer would be provided for him if he wished and could not afford one. 263
Another factor which indicated to the Washington Court that the defendant's ability
to exercise his rights had not been impaired was that he had been explicitly warned of
his right not to respond to incriminating questions prior to the hearing. 266 The Supreme
Court has consistently noted that witnesses are not entitled to an explicit warning of
their rights. 267 Witnesses, however, are usually aware that they have the right to assert
the privilege in the courtroom because the Court has clearly established this right in a
long line of precedent. 266 Various safeguards, therefore, dispel pressure on witnesses
including the opportunity to obtain legal advice and the clear scope of the right available
to witnesses in the courtroom. 269
The circumstances under which Murphy was interrogated, however, did not contain
any safeguards similar to those which assist a witness in asserting the privilege against
self-incrimination. Contrary to the Court's assertion, Murphy's situation was not analo-
gous to the example of a witness served with a subpoena. Unlike a grand jury witness,
Murphy had no reason to know that he was to be interrogated about prior criminal
conduct. Like any probationer, Murphy met regularly with his supervising officer. 27°
During a typical meeting, probation officers will question probationers about their pres-
ent activities and counsel them with any problems they might be having at home or at
work. 27 ' Probation meetings center on conduct which occurs during the period of pro-
Because the individual is provided with some information regarding what possible criminal conduct
the grand jury is investigating in the subpoena, the witness has an opportunity in advance to
prepare himself legally and psychologically for questioning.
26°
	 States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 567-68, 584 (1976) (after defendant was sub-
poenaed to testify about criminal activities in which he may have been involved, was warned that
he was not required to answer incriminating questions, and told that a lawyer would be provided
for him if he wished, his statements were admissible).
26L 431 U.S. 181 (1977). See supra text accompanying notes 123-30.
264 1d. at 183-84.
2691d. at 188.
264 Id.
262
266 Id,
267
	 e.g., United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 579-80 (1976).
26a
	 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 439 (1974), the Court noted that: "At this point in
our history virtually every schoolboy is familiar with the concept, if not the language" of the
constitutional ban on compelled self-incrimination.
269 See supra notes 257-68 and accompanying text.
22° One of Murphy's probation conditions was to meet with his probation officer as directed.
104 S. Ct. at 1140. For a description of a typical meeting see supra note 20.
271 Pet. App. C, supra note 20, at 6. During probation interviews, the Court has noted "concern
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bation, not upon pre-probation conduct. It is unlikely, therefore, that Murphy could
have anticipated that he would be asked about prior criminal conduct.
Despite the Court's assertion to the contrary, Murphy's receipt of a letter from his
probation officer requesting a meeting did not have the same effect as the receipt of a
subpoena. Unlike a subpoena, the letter did not suggest that Murphy's past record was
to be discussed. The probation officer's letter informed Murphy that the purpose of the
meeting was "No further discuss a treatment plan for the remainder of [his] proba-
tion."272 Because the letter indicated that issues dealing with the future of his probation
were to be discussed, .Murphy had no reason to assume that incriminating questions
regarding his prior criminal conduct would be asked. Murphy, therefore, had no reason
to believe that he needed to consult with a lawyer in advance of the meeting.
Besides having no opportunity to consult with counsel, Murphy's ability to assert
the privilege against self-incrimination was thwarted because the scope of Murphy's right
to refuse to answer his probation officer was ambiguous. As the dissent correctly pointed
out, at the time he was questioned the law was not clear on whether Murphy's status as
a probationer limited his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. 273 The United
States had argued before the Supreme Court that Murphy could permissibly have been
subject to more pressure to incriminate himself than a person who had not been convicted
of a crime. 274 The government lawyers, however, seriously misconceived the rights that
Murphy might have asserted when questioned by his probation officer. 275 It is both
insensible and unjust to require that a probationer know that he has a right to refuse to
answer his probation officer when government lawyers who are knowledgeable in the
law misinterpret the scope of his privilege against self-incrimination.
Thus, application of the forfeiture principle to the facts presented in Murphy was
unjustified. Murphy could not have anticipated that he would be asked about prior
criminal conduct or that he would have reason to seek legal advice about his rights prior
to the probation meeting. Moreover, at the time Murphy was questioned, the law on
whether he had a right to refuse to answer his probation officer was ambiguous. Even
under the rationale of the Court's opinion, it is unclear whether Murphy would have
known that he had a right not to answer incriminating questions. Under established
precedent, witnesses have the clearly defined right to refuse to answer any incriminating
question.276 The Murphy decision, however, provides probationers with a more confusing
for the client dominates [the probation officer's] professional attitude." Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411
U.S. 778, 783-84 (1973).
2" The Court suggested that Murphy should have assumed from the letter in which his
probation officer instructed him to make an appointment that he would be asked incriminating
questions. 104 S. Ct. at 1145.
275
	
at 1158-59 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See supra notes 235-36 and accompanying text.
2" 104 S. Ct. at 1159 n.23 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Solicitor General argued in an amicus
curiae brief that "[w]hen a person has been convicted of a crime, his constitutional rights can be
limited to the extent reasonably necessary to accommodate the government's penal and rehabilitative
interests." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8, Minnesota v, Murphy, 104 S. Ct. 1136
(1984).
275 The Court rejected the government's contention that the probationer's privilege against self-
incrimination may be limited. 104 S. Ct. at 1142. The Court stated "notwithstanding that a defendant
is imprisoned or on probation at the time he makes incriminating statements, if those statements
are compelled they are inadmissible in a subsequent trial for a crime other than that for which he
has been convicted." Id.
276 See, e.g., Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 473 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (a witness may
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procedure by which to determine when they have the right to refuse to answer their
probation officer's questions."' Suppose, for example, that a probationer is asked an
incriminating question by his probation officer. He would have the right to refuse to
respond if the answer would be incriminating at a criminal proceeding 2 78 If, however,
the answer relates to his probation status, under Murphy, the probationer must answer
the probation officer's questions even if the answer would be usable at a probation
revocation hearing. 228 In the wake of Murphy, therefore, a probationer's right to refuse
to answer his probation officer's questions, depends not upon whether the answer would
incriminate him but upon whether the question is arguably related to the probationer's
probationary status. Such a standard hardly serves to provide probationers with guidance
regarding when they have a clear right to claim the privilege.
2. Was There a "Reasonably Perceived" Threat?: The Murphy Decision and Threat of
Legal Sanctions
The general rule that a witness must claim the privilege against self-incrimination
is subject to exception when the exercise of' the privilege is threatened with a penalty. 28 °
The Supreme Court held that Murphy was not deterred from claiming the privilege
because the threat of probation revocation was not "reasonably perceived. "281 The Court
in Murphy determined the reasonableness of the threat of probation revocation by
referring to its prior cases which dealt with situations where the stale threatened the
exercise of the privilege with a penalty. 282 Here again, however, the Court was relying
on its tenuous witness analogy because in all of the prior cases referred to by the Court,
the individuals being threatened were witnesses. 285 For example, the Court compared
Murphy's situation with the facts of Garrity v. New Jersey. 284 In Garrity, policemen who
were summoned to a grand jury investigation of police corruption were expressly in-
formed that they would be discharged from the police department if they claimed the
privilege against self-incrimination. 285 The disclosures that the police officers made were
not be required to answer a question if there is some rational basis for believing that it will
incriminate him).
277 See 104 S. Ct. at 1147 n.7; id. at 1150 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
276
	 id. at 1150 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
279 Id.
280 See supra notes 132-46 and accompanying text.
2" 104 S. Ct. at 1149. See supra notes 197-210 and accompanying text.
282 104 S. Ct. at 1146-49. See supra notes 132-46, 196 and accompanying text.
2" See Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 803 (1977) (political party officer summoned
to appear before special grand jury authorized to investigate the party officer's conduct); Lefkowitz
v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 75-76 (1974) (architects summoned to testify before a grand jury investi-
gating various charges of conspiracy, bribery, and larceny); Uniformed Sanitation Men v. Commis-
sioner of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280, 281-82 (1968) (Department of Sanitation employees summoned
to testify before grand jury investigating alleged charges of larceny); Gardner v. Broderick, 392
U.S. 273, 274-75 (1968) (police officer summoned to testify before grand jury investigating alleged
bribery and corruption of police officers in connection with unlawful gambling operations); Garrity
v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 494 (1967) (police officers summoned to appear before Attorney
General who was investigating alleged fixing of traffic tickets).
28"
	
S. Ct. at 1148. See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
2d5
	 385 U.S. at 494.
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introduced against them in subsequent criminal prosecutions. 286 The Court held that the
incriminating statements were involuntary and therefore inadmissible because the police
officers faced the penalty of discharge if they chose to remain silent. 287
Unlike the policemen in Garrity, Murphy was not expressly threatened by his pro-
bation officer."' The Court emphasized the absence of an express threat to justify its
conclusion that Murphy's apprehension of having his probation revoked was not rea-
sonable. 289 This lack of an express threat, however, should not have been determinative.
The Court indicated earlier in Murphy that implied threats as well as express threats may
foreclose an individual's free choice to remain silent. 290 Because the Court was preoc-
cupied with the witness analogy and express threats, it failed to address whether an
implied threat deterred Murphy from claiming the privilege. 29 ' The Court overlooked
the fact that Murphy was faced with a threat of legal sanction implicit in the probationary
relationship which was just as coercive as an express threat faced by a witness before a
grand jury.
As regards the question of implied coercion, there are significant differences be-
tween the probationer's situation and that of a witness. Probation officers enjoy broad
power to exercise coercive force over individuals under their supervision including the
power to arrest and to release. 292 Probation officers are "armed with the power to
recommend or even declare revocation. "295 One commentator has noted that the pro-
286 Id. at 495.
"7 Id. at 497-98.
288
	
104 S. Ct. at 1140-41, 1148.
289 Id. at 1147-48. First, the Court examined Murphy's probation conditions to determine if
the conditions contained an impermissible threat of penalty. Id. at 1147. Interpreting the condition
"BE TRUTHFUL to your Probation Officer in all matters" as merely a truthfulness requirement
which still allowed Murphy to decline answering incriminating questions, the Court concluded that
the state did not attempt to attach a penalty on Murphy's exercise of the privilege. Id. at 1147-49.
Besides not finding a written threat, the Court relied on the absence of "direct evidence that
Murphy confessed because he feared that his probation would be revoked if he remained silent."
Id. at 1148. The Court thus implied that Murphy had to prove that, but for the threat, he would
not have confessed. See id. See supra notes 198-210 and accompanying text.
286 104 S. Ct. at 1146. The Court stated:
There is thus a substantial basis in our cases for concluding that if the state, either
expressly or by implication, asserts that invocation of the privilege would lead to
revocation of probation, it would have created the classic penalty situation, the failure
to assert the privilege would be excused, and the probationer's answers would be
deemed compelled and inadmissible in a criminal prosecution.
Id.
28 ' See id. at 1147-48.
492 Czajkoski, Exposing the Quasi JudicialRole of the Probation Officer, 37 FED. PROB. 9, 13 (1973).
"With his awesome authority over the probationer, the probation officer may in various ways restrict
his liberty ... . The probation officer, in the name of rehabilitation and under the banner of
standard conditions of probation, can demand that the probationer not live in or frequent certain
areas, that he not engage in certain employment, and that he refrain from a number of interpersonal
associations." Id. See also Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 447 (1982). In Cabell, the Court
described the power of probation officers as follows: "The probation officer acts as an extension of
the judiciary's authority to set the conditions under which particular individuals will lead their lives
and of the executive's authority to coerce obedience to those conditions. From the perspective of
the probationer, his probation officer may personify the State's sovereign powers .. . Id.
2" Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 784 (1973).
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bation officer controls the revocation action, 294
 and the process of revocation is, itself,
highly discretionary. 2"
Moreover, the probationer's continued liberty depends on his observance of the
conditions of probation. 296 Probationers, therefore, are particularly conscientious of
being cooperative with their probation officers. 297 A probationer summoned to the
probation office and asked an incriminating question may reasonably fear that failure
to answer would be a violation of probation for which his probation could be revoked. 2"
The probation officer's power to recommend revocation of probation, along with the
probationer's duty to cooperate with the probation officer creates an implied threat that
legal sanctions are likely if the probationer fails to respond when questioned. 299
In the courtroom, by comparison, witnesses are not confronted with such implicit
threats. Although the grand jury enjoys broad power to investigate," 0 the relationship
between the witness and the grand jury does not contain the implied threat to an
immediate and discretionary curtailment of liberties which exists in the probationer-
probation officer relationship. The grand jury, for example, does not set the conditions
of a witness's life. Nor is the witness dependent on the grand jury for his continued
liberty in the way the probationer is dependent on the probation officer."' Therefore,
294 Czajkoski, supra note 292, at 12. "While it is the judge who actually revokes probation, it is
the probation officer who initiates the revocation action and largely controls it. In a very high
proportion of cases, the judge's revocation action is in accord with the probation officer's recom-
mendation." Id.
798 Id. Czajkoski notes that probation officers often invoke technical violations against a pro-
bationer when new criminal offenses are suspected but cannot be easily proved. According to
Czajkoski:
Given the vague and all-encompassing nature of conditions of probation, it is not
difficult for the probation officer to muster a technical violation as needed. Many
probationers are in a steady state of probation violations as a result of conditions
relating to keeping "decent hours," abstaining from alcohol, and various prohibitions
relating to sexual activity. These violations usually go unenforced by the probation
officer until such times as he is given reason to believe that a new criminal offense has
occurred.
Id. at 12-13.
296
 People v. Alston, 77 A.D.2d 906, 907, 431 N.Y.S.2d 82, 84 (1980) (parolee's "vital interest
in continued release [depends] upon his obedience and cooperation with his supervising parole
officer").
297 See id.
798 See, e.g., United States v. Deaton, 468 F.2d 541, 544 (5th Cir. 1972). The Dealon court noted
that "[A] parolee is under heavy psychological pressure to answer inquiries made by his parole
officer, perhaps even greater than when the interrogation is by an enforcement officer." Id.
"') The probationer is faced with a dilemma when the probation officer asks an incriminating
question: if on the one hand, he remains silent and refuses to answer the probation officer's
questions, he may be found to have violated a condition of his probation; if, on the other hand the
probationer feels compelled to talk in order to comply with his probationary obligations, he gives
incriminating information that may be used against him.
31" Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972). The grand jury has great latitude to inquire
into the existence of possible criminal conduct. Id. A witness has a duty to appear and testify if
subpoenaed by the grand jury. See id. The powers of the grand jury, however, are limited because
it is subject to judicial supervision. Id. The Court has also noted that interrogation before a grand
jury is not likely to involve psychologically oriented techniques designed to coerce the individual to
incriminate himself. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 579-80 (1976). This may be so
because questioning before a grand jury occurs under the guidance of a judge.
8"' See, e.g., Uniformed Sanitation Men v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280, 281-82
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because the probationary context is not truly analogous to that of the testifying witness
context, the Court erred when it determined the reasonableness of a threat presented
to probationers by comparison to the witness context.
Instead of merely relying on questionable analogies to determine that Murphy's
confession was not coerced, the Court should have reviewed the circumstances of Mur-
phy's meeting with his probation officer to determine if he was actually deterred from
claiming his fifth amendment privilege by a reasonably perceived threat. According to
the findings of the trial court, which were accepted by both the Minnesota Supreme
Court and the United States Supreme Court, Murphy was summoned to the probation
office "Rio further discuss a treatment plan for the remainder of [his] probation ....'' 302
When confronted with the information about the murder, Murphy told his probation
officer he needed a lawyer.s 03 The probation officer, however, said he could not see a
lawyer until he left the office. 3" After the probation officer dissuaded Murphy from
asserting what he may have thought was his right to a lawyer, it would be unrealistic to
expect Murphy to assert his rights further as the Court suggested. 505
Murphy reasonably may have thought that he would have been subject to sanctions
if he refused to answer his probation officer. 306 At the time of the meeting, Murphy was
in violation of his probation for having failed to complete a treatment program for
sexual offenders. 3°7 The probation officer told Murphy that she wanted to talk about
the murder because she believed that he needed to go back to treatments" Murphy had
reason to believe that if he was uncooperative in discussing his need for treatment the
probation officer could have revoked his probation for having failed to complete treat-
ments" Contrary to the Court's assertion, Murphy's apprehension that his probation
would be revoked for failing to answer his probation officer's question was reasonable.
In light of the legal sanction implicit in the probationary relationship, the voluntariness
of Murphy's statements is subject to considerable doubt.
The Court in Murphy reasoned that even if Murphy believed he was threatened with
probation revocation, that belief was unreasonable because his probation could not have
been automatically revoked. 3 ' 0 The Court concluded that Murphy would not have been
penalized because a hearing was necessary before revocation of probations" This rea-
soning is invalid for two reasons. First, it is not consistent with prior case law. The police
officers in Garrity, for example, were not faced with an automatic penalty for asserting
(1968) (employees advised that their employment would terminate if they refused to testify with
respect to their official conduct on the ground of self-incrimination).
" 2 State v. Murphy, 324 N.W.2d 340,341 (Minn. 1982).
3" Id.
"4 Id.
305 See 104 S. Ct. at 1154 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Court noted, however, that Murphy
should have asked for a clarification of his probation conditions by asking his probation officer
whether he would violate his probation conditions for refusing to answer. Id. at 1148.
806 See supra notes 280-87 and accompanying text. Murphy had two years remaining on his
probation. Pet. App. C., supra note 20, at 31. Murphy had reason, therefore, to maintain the good
will of the probation officer.
5" See supra note 26.
"8 State v. Murphy, 324 N.W.2d 340,341 (Minn. 1982).
"9 See supra notes 280-87 and accompanying text.
310 Murphy, 104 S. Ct. at 1148.
3" Id. The Court also concluded that Murphy should have known that his probation could not
have been revoked for an exercise of the fifth amendment privilege. Id.
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the privilege. 512 The police officers were only told that they "may be subjected to a
proceeding to have [them] removed from office" if they asserted the privilege."'" In
much the same way, Murphy may have been subjected to a proceeding to revoke his
probation if the probation officer determined he violated the terms of his probation by
failing to discuss further treatment.""
Second, contrary to the Court's assertion, Murphy was in fact faced with an automatic
penalty if he asserted the privilege — loss of freedom. If Murphy failed to discuss the
prior incident in relation to his need for further treatment, a condition of his current
probation, he would have violated his probation conditions." 5 The probation officer,
under Minnesota law, could then have caused Murphy to "be taken into immediate
custody" and held without bail pending a revocation hearings'" The threat of loss of
liberty by being put into jail without bail is as great or even greater a penalty that the
threat of loss of employment involved in Garrity.
The circumstances surrounding Murphy's interview with his probation officer in-
dicate that Murphy's apprehension of having his probation revoked for failing to answer
was reasonable. Murphy would have faced the penalty of loss of liberty pending a
revocation hearing if the officer determined that he had violated his probation condi-
tions. The Court's reasoning that Murphy was not deterred from claiming the privilege
is not persuasive because the Court overlooked the threat implicit in the probationary
relationship and the circumstances of Murphy's interview.
B. Custody, Coercive Atmosphere and Miranda Warnings
The Murphy Court held that probation officers are not required to give Miranda
warnings prior to noncustodial interviews of probationers."/ The Court found that
because Murphy was not in custody, the probation officer's failure to warn Murphy of
his rights did not bar Murphy's confession from being used at his criminal trial."'" This
section will examine the Court's conclusion that Murphy was not entitled to Miranda
512 See Garrity., 385 U.S. at 495. See also supra note 283 and cases cited therein.
313 Garrity, 385 U.S. at 504 n.1 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
"4 MINN. STA .r. § 609.14 (1982) sets forth the probation revocation procedure as follows:
When it appears that the defendant has violated any of the conditions of his probation
or has otherwise been guilty of misconduct which warrants the imposing or execution
of sentence, the court may without notice revoke the stay thereof and probation and
direct that the defendant be taken into immediate custody.
The defendant shall thereupon be notified in writing and in such manner as the
court directs of the grounds alleged to exist for revocation of the stay of imposition
or execution of sentence. If such grounds are brought in issue by the defendant, a
summary hearing shall be held thereon at which he is entitled to be heard and to be
represented by counsel ....
Id.
915
 Brief for Petitioner, Appendix B at 14, Minnesota v. Murphy, 104 S. Ct. 1136 (1984). The
trial court observed that "a condition of his probation was that he be honest with his probation
officer, and that he was there ostensibly to discuss further treatment in regard to his current
probation. Failure to follow through with either of these could have resulted in revocation of the
probation and potential imprisonment." Id.
"6 MINN. STAT. § 609.14 (1982). See supra note 314 for text of Minnesota's probation revocation
statute.
517 104 S. Ct. at 1146.
501 Id.
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warnings. It will be maintained that in light of the policies underlying the Fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination and the spirit of Miranda, there is a legitimate
basis to require that Miranda warnings be given by the state under circumstances similar
to those of Murphy's interrogation by his probation officer.
The current trend of the Court's opinions adopts a literal approach in determining
when a custodial situation exists and Miranda warnings are necessary. The Court requires
either actual arrest or "'restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with
a formal arrest" before warnings are necessary. 31 The Court has indicated that custody
bears a more direct correlation to physical control than to any psychologically oriented
restraint. 520
The Court continued this trend in Minnesota v. Murphy."' In a footnote, the Court
emphasized that "Murphy was not under arrest. and ... he was free to leave at the end
of the meeting. A different question would have been presented if he had been inter-
viewed by his probation officer while being held in police custody or by the police
themselves in a custodial setting." 522 Murphy is thus consistent. with the Court's "literal"
reading of the custody requirement of Miranda.
Although Murphy is consistent with Miranda in a literal sense, the spirit of Miranda
and the policies underlying the privilege suggest that safeguards were necessary before
Murphy's probation officer questioned him. The rationale of Miranda goes beyond the
narrow issue of physical restraint in determining custody. 323 Rather, Miranda required
319 California v. Beheler, 103 S. Ct. 3517, 3520 (1983) (per curiam) (quoting Oregon v. Mathia-
son, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam)).
52° See Note, Custodial Interrogation After Oregon v. Malhiason, 78 DUKE L. j. 1497 (1978). See also
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam).
52 ' 104 S. Ct. 1136 (1984).
322 Id. at 1143 n.5.
"' Following the Miranda decision, some federal and state courts emphasized the coercive,
rather than the custodial, nature of the setting in evaluating when warnings were required. See,
e.g., United States v. Caiello, 420 F.2d 471, 473 (2d Cir. 1969), cm, denied, 397 U.S. 1039 (1970);
Nail v. Slayton, 353 F. Supp. 1013, 1017-18 (W.D. Va. 1972). The courts reasoned that Miranda's
safeguards were designed to counterbalance the compelling pressures inherent in a custodial setting.
See, e.g., People v. Arnold, 66 Cal. 2d 438, 447, 426 P.2d 515, 520, 58 Cal. Rptr. 115, 120 (1967)
("Nile vice of the custodial interrogation which [Miranda] condemned lay in the psychological
coercion implicit in interrogation in the isolated chamber from which the suspect may reasonably
believe.he cannot leave"). The requirement of warnings in a setting where a suspect could reasonably
feel that he is not free to go, although not literally deprived of his freedom of action, the lower
courts determined, would be consistent with the spirit of Miranda. The lower courts concluded that
this "psychological restraint" constituted the functional, and therefore legal, equivalent of custody.
See United States v. Harrison, 265 F. Supp. 660, 661-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (parolee who was asked
by police to go to station for questioning actually believed himself compelled to cooperate with
police, and thus, had same coercive effect as if he had actually been in custody). For example, the
Supreme Court of California in People v. Arnold, 66 Cal. 2d 438, 448, 426 P.2d 515, 520, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 115, 121 (1967), held that "custody occurs if the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way or is led to believe, as a reasonable person, that he is so deprived,"
In Arnold, the court found that the defendant was in custody when questioned by a district attorney
because she might reasonably have believed that if' she had attempted to leave during the interrog-
ation, she would have been arrested or physically detained. Id. at 448-49, 426 P.2d at 521-22, 58
Cal. Rptr. at 121-22. The California Supreme Court also suggested that on retrial, the trial court
should consider the extent to which the authorities confronted defendant with evidence of her
guilt. Id. at 449, 426 P.2d at 522, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 122. The court noted that this factor might have
led the defendant to reasonably believe that her freedom was significantly restricted. Id. at 449, 426
P.2d at 522, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
1022	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Voi. 26:989
warnings to neutralize situations in which there are "inherently compelling pressures
which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak
"324
Coercion was the evil with which Miranda sought to grapple. 325
 The Court recognized
in Miranda that police officers•were taking advantage of coercive interrogation techniques
to procure confessions to be used against suspects. 326 The Miranda Court offered a
detailed account of the psychologically oriented coercive techniques referred to in various
police manuals. 327 One tactic was to be alone with the person under interrogation. 328
Another technique noted by the Court was to posit the guilt of the accused as a fact and
to maintain only an apparent interest in confirming specific details. 329 Trickery is also
referred to in the manuals as a tactic to induce a confession 33° The Court noted that
further coercive interrogation techniques were advised in such manuals should the
subject wish to speak to an attorney or relative."' The Court designed the remedy of
warnings to shield suspects from such interrogation strategies. 332 Recognizing the coer-
cive atmosphere that generally exists in the context of a police interrogation, the Court
held that law enforcement officials are required to fully advise the suspect of his consti-
tutional rights before custodial interrogation. 3 " 9 According to the Court, one basic pur-
pose of the remedy of exclusion of all in-custody statements without prior Miranda
warnings was to deter law enforcement officers from taking advantage of interrogation
techniques "at odds with one of our nation's most cherished principles — that the
individual may not be compelled to incriminate himself." 33 ]
Murphy's probation officer, however, took advantage of interrogation techniques
similar to those noted by the Miranda Court in order to procure a confession to be used
to convict Murphy. First, the probation officer's conduct was deceptive and incorporated
several elements of trickery condemned by the Miranda COIEEL. 355 While wanting to convey
"4 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
325 /(1. at 456. "In the cases before us today, ... we concern ourselves primarily with this
interrogation atmosphere and the evils it can bring." Id.
326 Id. at 445-55.
'27 Id.
325 Id, at 449-50.
323 Id. at 450.
The officers are instructed to minimize the moral seriousness of the offense, to cast
blame on the victim or on society. These tactics are designed to put the subject in a
psychological state where his story is but an elaboration of what the police purport to
know already — that he is guilty.
Id.
"° Id. at 453.
"31 Id. at 454. The Court noted that the following advice is given in the police manuals if the
subject wishes to speak to a relative or attorney:
the interrogator may suggest that the subject save himself or his family the expense
of any such professional service, particularly if he is innocent of the offense under
investigation. The interrogator may also add, "Joe, I'm only looking for the truth, and
if you're telling the truth, that's it. You can handle this by yourself."
Id. (quoting from INBAU & REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONE -FISSIONS 112 (1962)).
332 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
"" Id. at 444.
"4 Id. at 457-58.
"5 See supra note 330. The Court condemned trickery in Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315,
323 (1959) (officers played on trust and falsely said job was in jeopardy). The current Court,
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the information about Murphy's pre-probation crime to the police, 336 the probation
officer needed Murphy to talk about the murder in her presence before the information
could be used to convict him of the crime. 337 The probation officer thereby summoned
Murphy to her office to discuss "further treatment." 3" By apparently limiting the pur-
pose of the meeting to discuss a condition of his current probation status, the probation
officer misled Murphy and took advantage of the threat of legal sanction implicit in the
probation relationship. 339 Had the probation officer asked Murphy to appear in her
office without indicating a specific purpose, the officer's conduct would have been less
suspect.
Once Murphy was inside the probation office, the probation officer utilized a tactic
referred to in pre -Miranda police manuals.") She took Murphy by surprise by positing
his guilt as a known fact, 341 and exacerbated Murphy's confusion by prodding him to
discuss the rape-murder in the context of its relationship to the offense for which he
was on probation. 342 Like the police interrogation technique noted in Miranda, Murphy's
probation officer appeared to maintain only an interest in confirming details — the
relationship between the past crime and Murphy's need for further treatment. 343 The
Miranda Court noted that such tactics are designed to put the subject in a psychological
state so that a confession of guilt will follow. 344 Murphy's responses to his probation
officer confirm that he thought he could clear himself of trouble with his probation
however, seems to have greater tolerance for trickery. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S, 492, 495-
96 (1977) (per curiam) (police falsely told defendant that his fingerprints were found at burglary
scene but Court held these false statements were irrelevant to the issue of custody).
338 104 S. Ct. at 1140 ("After discussions with her superior, the officer determined that the
police should have this information"). See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
"' Murphy, 104 S. Ct. at 1140 n. 1 . Applicable confidentiality laws prohibited the officer from
directly telling the authorities about the information received from the treatment facility. See supra
notes 24-25.
338 104 S. Ct. at 1140.
3" Id. The Court contended that there is no evidence that Murphy's probation officer used
treatment as a subterfuge. Id. According to the Court, the result in Murphy would not have changed
even if the probation officer's sole purpose was to obtain incriminating statements for the police.
Id. at 1140 n.2.
See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448-55. The Miranda Court noted that interrogation manuals
instructed the police:
to display an air of confidence in the suspect's guilt and from outward appearance to
maintain only an interest in confirming certain details. The guilt of the subject is to
be posited as a fact. The interrogator should direct his comments toward the reasons
why the subject committed the act, rather than court failure by asking the subject
whether he did it.
Id. at 450.
34, See Murphy, 104 S. Ct. at 1140. The probation officer did not ask Murphy whether he
committed the crime. Rather, the officer opened the meeting by telling Murphy that she knew he
had admitted committing a rape-murder. Id.
342 Id. at 1141; see supra note 340. At the time of the meeting, Murphy had two years remaining
on his probation. Pet. App. C., supra note 20, at 31. The penalty for rape-murder in Minnesota is
mandatory life imprisonment. MINN. STAT. § 609.185(2) (1974). By telling Murphy that the purpose
of the meeting was "to discuss a treatment plan for the remainder of [his] probation," the probation
officer implicitly represented that Murphy would not be subject to criminal penalty if be discussed
the murder. Pet. App. C., supra note 20, at 36.
"' See supra note 340.
344 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 450.
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officer by discussing the prior crime. After admitting that he had committed the crime,
Murphy immediately explained that further treatment was not necessary because the
crime was caused by a drug habit that he had since broken." 5
The probation officer's response to Murphy's exclamation that he wanted to call a
lawyer is also reminiscent of a police tactic highlighted in Miranda. The police manuals
cited by the Miranda Court advised officers to dissuade persons from speaking to attor-
neys by indicating that they could handle the questioning on their own. 349 Similarly,
Murphy's probation officer belittled his request to speak with a lawyer by indicating that
he could not call from her office. 347
 Murphy testified that after he asked to call a lawyer,
the probation officer "seemed ... kind of angry and frustrated." 45 Then the probation
officer explained to Murphy that all she wanted to talk about was the relationship between
the prior crime and the crime for which he was on probation. 349 The probation officer
was implying that this was a matter which Murphy was able to discuss with her without
a lawyer.
Furthermore, the probation officer employed a third tactic condemned by the
Miranda Court — being alone with the person under interrogation in the confines of
the interrogator's office. Privacy, the Miranda Court noted, is essential to prevent dis-
traction and to deprive [the person] of any outside support."'" Murphy's meeting was
held in private. No family or friends were present to support him. Moreover, the meeting
was held in the probation officer's office. As one police manual stated, the investigator
possesses all the advantages in his own office because the atmosphere suggests "the
invincibility of the forces of the law."'" The same is true in the probation office. As one
commentator noted: "Viewed from the eyes of the probationer, the [probation] officer
represents a power that can, and does limit his freedom." 352
Although Murphy was familiar with the office, his familiarity did not dispel the
coercive atmosphere of the probation office. The coercive pressures in a probation office
are similar to those in a police office because the probation officer has power over the
conditions of the probationer's life and the discretion to restrict his liberty. As the
Supreme Court has noted, probationers look to their probation officers as an "officer of
the Court system that imposes punishment." 353 Murphy testified that he felt that if he
had walked out of the office without his probation officer's permission, his probation
would have been revoked. 354 The trial court observed that if Murphy did not discuss
further treatment in regard to his current probation, and instead walked out of the
office, the probation officer could have caused Murphy to have been "taken into im-
mediate custody and held without bail pending a revocation hearing." 355
Thus, contrary to the Court's conclusion, Murphy's probation interview was analo-
gous to interrogations held in police custody which occurred prior to Miranda. Miranda
343 Murphy, 104 S. Ct. at 1141.
846 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 454.
3" Murphy, 104 S. Ct. at 1140-41.
348 Pet. App. C, supra note 20, at 26.
343 104 S. Ct. at 1141.
350 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455.
"' Id. at 450.
352 Arcaya, The Multiple Realities Inherent in Probation Counseling, 37 Fen. PROB. 58,58-59 (1973).
353 Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707,721 (1979) (probationer's request for his probation officer
not a per se invocation of his fifth amendment rights under Miranda).
354
 Pet, App. C., supra note 20, at 19-20,26.
355 See supra note 315.
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sought to deter the use of coercive interrogation techniques. Because Murphy was
subjected to the same coercive pressures found to jeopardize the privilege against self-
incrimination in Miranda, he should have been warned of his rights by the probation
officer. The situation which confronted Murphy is not so dissimilar from that of a person
under arrest as to justify the imposition of differing standards leading to diametrically
opposite results.
C. Frustration of Constitutional Policies: The Murphy Court's Approval of the Use of the
Probation System to Gather Incriminating Statements
As a consequence of Murphy, noncustodial probation interviews may now be used
to gather evidence for criminal prosecutions. The Court indicated that Murphy's state-
ments would be admissible even if the probation officer's sole purpose was to obtain
incriminating statements.'" The probation system is not only an inappropriate system
to investigate pre-probation crimes, but also having probation officers act as detectives
is itself constitutionally offensive. The policies behind the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation and the deterrent purpose of Miranda will be frustrated if noncustodial probation
interviews are used to gather evidence to convict probationers of pre-probation crimes.
The function of the probation system is to supervise probationers, not to initiate
criminal investigation.'S7 As the Supreme Court has noted, the purpose of probation "is
to help individuals reintegrate into society as soon as they are able."'" Probationers and
probation officers are joined in a counseling relationship.'" Because the probation officer
is a court-appointed supervisor, there is tension between the needs of the probationer
as a "client" in a counseling relationship and the representative of a legal institution. 36°
The Court has recognized this tension and indicated that "concern for the client should
dominate [the probation officer's] professional attitude." 361
The normal duties of probation supervision entail routine questioning at interviews.
The probation officer, for example, may investigate the circumstances surrounding the
offense for which the probationer is on probation, or ask questions about the probation-
er's background. 362 The interview might also focus on an investigation into some incident
occurring during the period of probation which could lead to revocation of probation. 363
Sometimes, incriminating information may result when the probation officer asks a
356 Murphy, 104 S. Ct. at 1140 n.2.
"7 United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 267 (9th Cir. 1975) (law enforcement
agencies should not look to the probation system to gather evidence for criminal trials). The
Administrative Office of United States Courts has also indicated that the probation system should
not be used to obtain information for criminal prosecutions: "Self-incriminating statements made
in the routine course of probation business without 'Miranda' warnings may be used in revocation
hearings. The focus should be on obtaining this information for a probation revocation bearing
rather than for further criminal prosecution." Brief for Respondent at 30 n.14, Minnesota v.
Murphy, 104 S. Ct. 1136 (1984) (quoting X GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, at 4-
35).
35" Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 783 (1973) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
477 (1972)).
Arcaya, supra note 352 at 58.
560 Id.
"' Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 783-84 (1973).
Amicus brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers at 10, Minnesota v.
Murphy, 104 S. Ct. 1136 (1984).
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probationer about other criminal conduct. 364
 This type of questioning is within the realm
of effective probation supervision because the purpose of those questions is only to
determine whether to further regulate or revoke probation. 365
The purpose of Murphy's probation officer's questions, however, was not to inves-
tigate a pre-probation crime to further supervise Murphy's probation, but to obtain
incriminating statements which could later be used to convict him of a capital crime. 366
The probation officer went beyond the rehabilitation function and utilized the proba-
tionary relationship for an entirely different purpose. This type of conduct is not only
disruptive to the effectiveness of probation supervision, 367
 but will also allow police to
use probation officers to question probationers in noncustodial settings when the pro-
bationer is suspected of a crime. 369
Moreover, if the probation officer is delegated the police's interrogation function in
noncustodial interviews, the basic purpose behind Miranda of deterring law enforcement
officers from taking advantage of coercive interrogation techniques will be frustrated. 369
Without having to give Miranda warnings, the probation officer can utilize the counseling
relationship to obtain a confession, and report the confession to the police. The probation
364
 Id.
365
 Brief for Defendant at 32, Minnesota v. Murphy, 104 S. Ct. 1136 (1984). Probation officers
should be able to question probationers freely regarding conduct during the term of probation
without having to give Miranda warnings before every meeting. When a probation officer seeks
incriminating evidence about a pre-probation crime, however, the probation officer should be
required to advise a probationer of the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. See infra notes 366-
78 and accompanying text.
366 See Murphy, 104 S. Ct. at 1140. The probation officer determined that the police should
have the information. Id. The officer arranged a meeting at which she wanted Murphy to discuss
the crime in relation to a current condition of his probation. Id. at 1140-41. incriminating state-
ments resulted. Id. The probation officer who was not even under court order, gave the statements
to the police. Id. Additional treatment did not appear to be the motive for the meeting. Thus, the
probation officer was acting not as the supervising official, but as an agent of the police.
367 The role of the probation system is to rehabilitate individuals. See supra notes 358-61 and
accompanying text. The benefit of a treatment program for sexual offenders is minimal, however,
if the probationer knows that his disclosures to a therapist will result in prosecution on criminal
charges. Moreover, after Murphy, the probationer may not freely relate information to his probation
officer for fear of incriminating himself. See Brief for Respondent at 33, Minnesota v. Murphy, 104
S. Ct. 1136 (1984). See also People v. Parker, 82 A.1/2d 661, 667, 442 N.Y.S.2d 803 (N.Y. App. Div.
1981), aff V, 57 N.Y.2d 815, 441 N.E.2d 1118, 455 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1982). The Parker court observed:
The use of statements made by a parolee to his parole officer as evidence in a criminal
trial against the parolee disrupts and destroys the confidence and trust which must
inevitably inhere in the relations created by the parole system. The parole system
presupposes the rehabilitation of the offender and must be built on the frank com-
munication of advice and information between parolee and his supervisor, and that
relationship will he damaged beyond repair if the indispensable pillar of candid
exchange is undermined.
Id.
"' The Murphy Court indicated that probation officers may obtain incriminating statements
for the police" in noncustodial settings without' giving Miranda warnings. See 104 S. Ct. at 1140
n.2.
369 See supra note 334 and accompanying text. In the fourth amendment context, this principle
has been applied by the Ninth Circuit. Smith v. Rhay, 419 F.2d 160, 162 (9th Cir. 1970) (a parole
officer may not conduct a warrantless search of items in the parolee's possession while acting on
the prior request of law enforcement officials and in concert with them).
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officer may even use coercive interrogation techniques which the Court prohibited police
officers from using in Miranda. 37° After the Court's decision in Murphy, the police now
have an incentive to utilize the probation system to gather evidence to convict proba-
tioners because Miranda warnings are not required in noncustodial interviews. The
requirements of having to warn suspects who are also probationers of their rights may
thereby be eliminated if the interrogating officer is a probation officer rather than a
police officer.
Moreover, the Court's approval of Murphy's probation officer's conduct is inconsis-
tent with our nation's accusatorial system of criminal justice. In such a system, the
government accuses and bears the burden of proving the guilt of a person accused of a
crime.37 ' The government must establish guilt by "evidence independently and freely
secured and may not by coercion prove its charge against an accused out of his own
mouth."372 One of the purposes of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation was to preserve this type of criminal justice system. 375 The privilege is implicated
when the government's questioning subverts our accusatorial system and, instead, be-
comes inquisitorial.'' In an inquisitorial investigation, the purpose of questioning is to
elicit admissions of guilt from the subject of the investigation."
Such an inquisitorial situation existed in Murphy's interview with his probation
officer. The probation officer sought to elicit evidence from Murphy by assuming a
nonadversarial position — that of probation officer instead of police officer. 576 Further-
more, using noncustodial probation interviews to elicit incriminating evidence is a way
"to avoid the burdens of independent investigation ...." 377 Murphy's probation officer
"° See supra notes 325-55 and accompanying text,
37 ' Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-4 1 (1961).
3" Id. See also Tehan v. Shutt, 382 U.S. 406, 415 (1966) (the basic purposes behind the privilege
against self-incrimination relate to "preserving the integrity of a judicial system in which even the
guilty are not to be convicted unless the prosecution 'shouldcr[s] the entire load'").
3" Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655 (1976) ("the fundamental purpose of the Fifth
Amendment [is] the preservation ()I' an adversary system of criminal justice"). See also Murphy v.
Waterfront Comm'n, '378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964), where the Court listed the recognized policies under-
lying the privilege:
The privilege against self-incrimination ... reflects many of our fundamental values
and most noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to
the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an
accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice, our fear that self-
incriminating statements will he elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense
of fair play which dictates "a fair state-individual balance by requiring the government
to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by
requiring the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load"
; our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the privilege,
while sometimes "a shelter to the guilty," is often "a protection to the innocent."
Id.
374 The privilege against self-incrimination was developed by opposition to the inquisitorial
practices of the English Courts of Star Chamber. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
975 See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440 (1974). The Tucker Court stated: "Anyone who
reads accounts of [the ecclesiastical inquisitions and Star Chamber proceedings], which placed a
premium on compelling subjects of investigation to admit guilt from their own lips, cannot help
but be sensitive to the Framer's desire to protect citizens against such compulsion." Id.
"6 See Murphy, 104 S. Ct. at 1160 (Marshall, j., dissenting).
"7 Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655-56 (1976).
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did not investigate but sought to induce Murphy to convict himself with his own state-
ments. 378
The underlying policies behind Miranda, therefore, suggest that Murphy should
have been warned of his rights before his probation officer sought to obtain incriminating
evidence regarding a pre-probation crime. Although Murphy was subjected to same sort
of coercive pressures found to jeopardize the privilege in Miranda, the Supreme Court
did not require that warnings be given him by his probation officer prior to questioning.
The Court took a much more restrictive view emphasizing technical custody or actual,
physical deprivation of the individual's freedom to walk away from questioning before
Miranda warnings are necessary. 379 Thus, Murphy deprives probationers much of the
protection provided by the privilege against self-incrimination.
CONCLUSION
In Minnesota v. Murphy, the Supreme Court relied on an inappropriate analogy
between the probation setting and the situation confronting witnesses before grand juries
in holding that probationers must affirmatively assert the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation in response to incriminating questions asked by probation officers. The Court
recognized that a "reasonably perceived" threat of penalty upon the exercise of the
privilege may excuse the obligation to claim the privilege. The reasonableness of the
threat, however, was improperly judged according to witness standards. Instead, the
reasonableness of the threat should have been judged according to circumstances actually
confronting the probationer.
Furthermore, while Murphy is consistent with the literal interpretation of Miranda,
the Court frustrated the spirit of Miranda and the policies underlying the privilege by
holding that Miranda warnings are not required to be administered by probation officers
before noncustodial probation interviews. The Court failed to recognize that unlike the
situation of a witness before a judicial body, Murphy's confession was procured in an
environment which lacked procedural safeguards. Murphy's probation interview con-
tained inherently compelling pressures which undermined his will in much the same
way as if he had been questioned while under arrest. Moreover, as a consequence of
Murphy, the police may be able to circumvent the requirements of Miranda by using the
probation system to gather evidence for criminal prosecutions of probationers suspected
of prior criminal activity. The probationer's privilege against self-incrimination, there-
fore, should have been protected by requiring Miranda warnings to be administered
prior to noncustodial probation interviews where probation officers attempt to gather
incriminating testimony regarding pre-probation crimes.
SUSAN P. LINEHAN
876 See Murphy, 104 S. Ct. at 1160 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
579 Id. at 1143 n.5.
